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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALTA INDUSTRIES LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, dba
STEELCO, and ALTA INDUSTRIES UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation,
in its capacity as general
partner of Alta Industries Ltd.,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,

vs
Supreme Court No. 900612
Priority No. 16

LYNN P. HURST and WASATCH
STEEL INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF RgVlEW
The issues presented by defendants and appellants for review
are as follows:
1.

Whether a certain settlement agreement

between plaintiffs and a third party, Volma Heaton,
bars plaintiffs' claims against defendants.

-1-

2.

Whether plaintiffs1 claims for conversion and

fraud are barred in whole or in part by the Statute of
Limitations.
3.

Whether the court's findings of fraud and

conspiracy are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
4.

Whether the finding of conversion is sup-

ported by the evidence.
5.

Whether the damages awarded were excessive.

With very limited exceptions, all of the issues presented by
defendants-appellants on appeal are issues of fact and, accordingly, the appropriate standard of review is the clearly erroneous
rule.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Copper State

Leasing Co. v. Black Appliance & Furniture, 770 P.2d 88, 93 (Utah
1988).

To the limited extent that appellants1 issues entail

legal issues, the standard of review is correctness. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah
1988).
The issues presented by plaintiffs and appellees under their
cross-appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the district court erroneously dismiss

Count VI of the Amended Complaint by ruling that to
state a claim under the Utah Racketeering Enterprises
Act, the claimant must demonstrate three separate

-2-

episodes of unlawful activity that involve separate and
distinct victims rather than merely showing three
separate episodes of unlawful activity that may involve
only one victim?
2.

Did the district court erroneously dismiss

Count VII of the Amended Complaint under the receiving
used or secondhand stolen property statute by ruling
that even though Wasatch Steel Inc. is a party dealing
in used personal property, nevertheless the statute
does not cover a business such as Wasatch Steel Inc.
and its activities.
Both of these are exclusively issues of law, for which the
standard of review is correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.

Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988).
THE DETERMINATIVE STATUTES RELEVANT
TO THE CROSS-APPEAL ARE AS FOLLOWS:
With respect to the Racketeering Enterprises Act claim, Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2):
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity11 means
engaging in conduct which constitutes the
commission of at least three episodes of
unlawful activity, which episodes are not
isolated, but have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and
be related either to each other or to the
enterprise. * * *
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With respect to the receiving stolen property statute, Utah
Code Ann, §76-6-408(2)(d), which defines the class of persons
liable under Section 76-6-412(2):
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or
operates a business dealing in or collecting
used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or an agent, employee or representative of the pawnbroker or person who buys,
receives or obtains property. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

Plaintiffs sought recovery from defen-

dants upon multiple theories based upon (i) defendants1 knowing
purchase at bargain prices of on the order of 100 loads of steel
products stolen from plaintiffs and (ii) defendants' payment of
bribes and kickbacks to plaintiffs1 employees to induce them to
inflate the prices that plaintiffs paid to defendants for steel
products purchased from defendants.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition.

Plaintiffs initiated

this action by filing their Complaint on April 11, 1989. The
case was tried to the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, sitting
without a jury, between September 25 and October 2, 1990. The
district court found for plaintiffs and against defendants on
plaintiffs1 theories of fraud, conspiracy, conversion, and
punitive damages, but dismissed plaintiffs1 claims under the
Racketeering Enterprises Act and the receiving stolen property
statute.

The Court entered and filed its Findings of Fact,
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Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on December 3, 1990. Defendants
filed their Notice of Appeal on December 20, 1990. Plaintiffs
filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal on December 24, 1990.
Statement of Facts.

Appellants object to appellees' failure

to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's findings,
failure to cite to the record, and inaccurate statements of what
the record shows.

Because appellees are dissatisfied with the

statement of facts of appellants, appellees offer their own
statement of facts.
Plaintiff Alta Industries Ltd. is a Utah limited partnership
that does business under the name of "Steelco."

Throughout

trial, plaintiff was identified as "Steelco" and the same reference will be used for the remainder of this brief.

Steelco is in

the business of selling and fabricating new steel products.
[R450 at 117.]
Wasatch Steel Inc. ("Wasatch Steel") is also in the steel
business.

It buys and sells both new and used steel products.

[R450 at 35-36.]

The capital stock of Wasatch. Steel is owned 70%

by Bill Holtman, 15% by his son-in-law, Lynn P. Hurst ("Hurst"),
and 15% by his daughter, Teresa Thompson.
31.]

[Exhibit 51-P; R454 at

At all material times, Holtman, Hurst, and Thompson com-

prised all of the directors and officers of Wasatch Steel. Hurst
was at all material times the Vice President and General Manager
of Wasatch Steel.

[R450 at 32-33.]
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For convenience, Wasatch

Steel and Hurst will sometimes be collectively referred to as
"defendants."
In this action, Steelco sought to recover from both Wasatch
Steel and Hurst the damages that it suffered because of two
discrete kinds of misconduct:

First, Wasatch Steel over a period

of years knowingly purchased at bargain prices on the order of a
hundred loads of steel that had been stolen from Steelco by Volma
Heaton, who was then an employee of Steelco.

Second, on multiple

occasions, Wasatch Steel and Hurst paid bribes and kickbacks to
two employees of Steelco, Volma Heaton and Chris Williams, to
induce them to cause Steelco to pay fraudulently inflated prices
for steel that Wasatch Steel sold to Steelco.

Volma Heaton was

employed as processing supervisor until 1985 and thereafter as
plant superintendent at Steelco and Chris Williams was employed
in Steelco1s purchasing department.
143-44.]

[R450 at 194-95; R451 at

Both were fired when the first hint of their improper

activity became known to Steelco.

[R450 at 137; R452 at 122-24.]

What follows is a substantially chronological description of the
events that give rise to this action.
Between 1983 and 1987, Volma Heaton stole a huge amount of
steel product from Steelco and resold that product to Wasatch
Steel at bargain prices.

[R450 at 204-05.] At trial, three

kinds of steel were discussed -- (i) new steel, (ii) remnant, and
(iii) scrap. Wasatch Steel's brief uses the inaccurate term
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"cuttings'1 misleadingly to suggest that the remnant steel stolen
by Heaton and sold to Wasatch Steel was basically junk of insignificant value.

The term "cuttings" was used in passing at trial

only once or twice -- the term "remnant" was almost universally
used by both Heaton and Hurst to describe the kind of steel that
was stolen and sold to Wasatch Steel.

[E.g., R450 at 39-40,

65-66; R454 at 134-35 (Hurst); R450 at 203; R451 at 74, 118
(Heaton).]

"New steel" is brand new steel, fresh from the mill,

in stock sizes generated by the mill.

Remnant steel, on the

other hand, is created when a piece of new steel in a stock size
is cut for any purpose leaving as a "remnant" a piece of steel
that is still new and still large enough to be useful in
Steelcofs operation of fabricating steel for its customers.
[R336 17; R450 at 117-20; R451 at 117-20.]

"Scrap," on the other

hand, is basically junk steel that is not reuseable but has value
only for remelting.

Scrap steel may be either pieces of new

steel that are too tiny to be reasonably used for other purposes
or fabricated, bent up, or rusted out steel that is not salable
as new steel because of its fabricated or rusted, used characteristics.

[R336 17.]

Steelco does not just sell new steel in stock sizes.
Steelco also cuts new steel into sizes and shapes and fabricates
by bending or the like steel into shapes, all as requested by its
customers.

In this process, Steelco generates two by-products --
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remnant and scrap.
very differently.

Steelco treated remnant steel and scrap steel
Volma Heaton and Steelcofs other employees

were directed to reuse the remnant steel generated in Steelcofs
operation to the maximum extent.

[R450 at 121-23.]

The remnant

material was placed in special racks within Steelco?s fabricating
area for reuse; scrap, on the other hand, was deposited in nscrap
tubs" for future sale to a scrap dealer.

[R450 at 118.] The

remnant material was worth as much to Steelco as new steel -- the
pieces were just smaller.

[R452 at 169-70.]

If Steelco was

requested to sell to a customer half a sheet of steel or half a
steel beam or the like, and a remnant of that size existed,
Steelco sold the remnant for the same price it would have charged
for new steel.
According to both Volma Heaton and Hurst, the material that
Heaton sold to Wasatch Steel was almost exclusively remnant, not
scrap.

[R450 at 39-41; R450 at 202-03; R451 at 74-75, 117.]

Heaton specifically testified that all of the stolen steel for
which recovery is sought in this case was remnant steel.
at 202-03.]
Steel.

[R450

Heaton sold scrap to Wasatch Metal, not Wasatch

[R451 at 117.]

Wasatch Metal was a company dealing in

scrap steel which was located near Wasatch Steel and was owned by
Jack Holtman, who is the brother of Bill Holtman (the 70% owner
of Wasatch Steel).

[R450 at 60.]
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All of the steel that was delivered by Volma Heaton to
Wasatch Steel for which Steelco was awarded damages was owned by
Steelco and stolen from Steelco -- Volma Heaton himself admitted
that he stole the steel.

[R450 at 202-05.]

Heaton stole the

steel after hours and went to great lengths to conceal his thefts
from his employer, Steelco.

Heaton knew that: Steelco required

that the usual paperwork be prepared for employees1 purchases of
steel for their own use, but he did not prepare such paperwork
for the stolen steel.

[R450 at 195-96.]

Instead, if other

Steelco employees became aware that he was removing steel from
Steelcofs premises, Heaton created phony paperwork which was
aimed at leading other Steelco employees to believe that he was
purchasing the steel and thereafter the paperwork was destroyed.
[R450 at 203-04.]
As the Court found, Hurst and Wasatch Steel knew that the
steel that Heaton was delivering had been stolen from Steelco.
[R338 113.]

Hurstfs and Heaton's dealings continued on a fre-

quent basis for in excess of four years.

[R450 at 68-70.] Volma

Heaton told Hurst on multiple occasions -- 20 to 25 -- that
Heatonfs deliveries to Wasatch Steel were to be kept secret.
[R451 at 7-8.]

In response, Hurst agreed not to tell anyone at

Steelco about Heatonfs deliveries.

[R451 at 8.]

By Hurst's own

admission, even though he knew that all of the steel was coming
from Steelco and even though he dealt with Heaton consistently
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and frequently over a four-plus year period, Hurst never happened
to mention to anyone at Steelco that Heaton was selling steel to
him or was being paid for the steel, Hurst always asked to deal
with Heaton at Steelco, Hurst dealt only with Heaton at Steelco,
and Hurst never paid Heaton on Steelcofs premises.
68-70; R454 at 143-44.]

[R450 at

All of Hurst's thirty-odd meetings with

Heaton at Steelco!s premises were clandestine -- Hurst never
announced his company name to Steelcofs receptionist, which is
unusual, and he and Volma Heaton always met behind closed doors,
which never happened with anyone other than Hurst.
68-70; R452 at 25-26, 79-80.]

[R450 at

Steelco's employees were left with

the impression that Hurst was only a social acquaintance of
Heaton1s.

[R452 at 26.]

The delivery process was also suspicious.

Heatonfs deliv-

eries were generally after Steelcofs business hours.
103-04.]

[R451 at 1,

Hurst sometimes went to Steelcofs premises and picked

out what he wanted, which was thereafter delivered to Wasatch
Steel, but Hurst inexplicably paid Heaton for the steel.
at 66-67.]

[R450

Hurst with Heaton actually entered Steelco's shop and

picked out for his purchase remnant, which he (as a person in the
steel business) knew or should have known was used and needed by
Steelco.

[R450 at 66-67.]

Any rational person would think it

strange to enter another steel company's shop, designate for
purchase remnant material from remnant racks, which are obviously
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used by that business, and then pay the company's employee for
that steel at a fraction of its true value.

Wasatch Steel

purchased the remnant for a fraction of its value to Steelco,
which Hurst also knew or should have known.

[R450 at 52-53.]

Wasatch Steel paid both Steelco and Heaton for exactly the same
kinds of materials in the amounts directed by Heaton, even though
all of the steel came from Steelco.

[R450 at 56-57, 66-67.]

Many of the deliveries of steel for which Heaton was paid were by
Steelcofs trucks, identified as such, yet Wasatch Steel paid
Heaton for the steel.

[R451 at 1, 114; R450 at 58-65.]

There is

no plausible reason why Steelco would furnish its own trucks to
deliver its own steel to Wasatch Steel so that Heaton could be
paid for the steel. When Steelcofs employees and trucks were
used to deliver steel to Wasatch Steel, Hurst: and Heaton arranged
to split Wasatch Steel's payment between Heaton and Steelco.
[R451 at 4-5.]

That, of course, left Steelco with the impression

that it was being paid for all of the steel that its trucks and
employees removed from Steelco's premises.

Even though, on

multiple occasions, the weight tickets delivered to Hurst showed
the customer to be "Steelco," Hurst nevertheless paid Heaton for
the steel.
I pay."

[R450 at 58-63.]

Hurst told Heaton "I don't care who

[R451 at 114-15.]

Wasatch Steel suggests in its brief that it was justified in
assuming that Heaton had the right to sell the steel since Heaton
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was a supervisor.

Wasatch Steel and Hurst could not have assumed

Heatonfs bona fides, since they were concurrently paying him
kickbacks and bribes to defraud his employer - - a practice that
Hurst, himself, called "sleazy.11

[R450 at 80-81.]

Over a four-plus year period, Heaton delivered to Wasatch
Steel on the order of 100 loads of steel, for which Wasatch Steel
paid Heaton the bargain price of $38,136.43.
at 150-52.]

[Exhibit 27-P; R452

The value of those same materials to both Steelco

and to Wasatch Steel was approximately double that amount.

[R450

at 52-53; R452 at 169-70.]
Wasatch Steel in its brief suggests that Steelco was awarded
damages against Wasatch Steel and Hurst for steel delivered to
them which either (i) was given to Heaton by Steelco or (ii) for
which Heaton paid Steelco.

No evidence supports either as-

sertion, and each will be addressed in turn.
The district court found that on one specific occasion,
Steelco did agree with Heaton that Heaton could have certain
specific scrap fabricated beams and old scrap fabricated steel
equipment if Heaton would on his own time cut up and remove those
specific materials from Steelco!s premises.

That arrangement

related only to specifically identified fabricated steel of a
quantity that did not exceed 40,000 pounds.
110; R338.]

[Finding of Fact

The trial court found that with the exclusive

exception of a maximum of 40,000 pounds of scrap that was so
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given to Heaton, all of the steel delivered to Wasatch Steel was
stolen.

[Id.]

The trial court did not award any damages to

Steelco for that 40,000 pound quantity of scrap that was given to
Heaton -- the value of that 40,000 pound quantity was deducted
from the amounts for which Wasatch Steel was found liable.
[Finding of Fact K58, R356.]

Steelcofs General Manager, Leon

Hansen, testified that the maximum amount of fabricated steel and
old equipment that was given to Heaton was 40,000 pounds and that
it was all scrap.

[R450 at 132-36.]

Heaton testified that the

only material given to him was scrap, which he sold to Wasatch
Metals.

[R451 at 12-14.]

Hurst testified that he did not intend

to purchase scrap from Steelco -- only remnant.

[R450 at 40-41.]

With respect to the steel for which Heaton paid, the evidence is also clear and uncontradicted.

Heaton himself testified

that he paid a total of only $200 to $300 to Steelco for his
personal purchases of material.

[R450 at 202; R451 at 90.] Bob

Elkington, Steelcofs Chief Executive Officer, searched all of
Steelcofs records for invoices evidencing Volma Heaton's purchases throughout his employment and located only invoices
totaling approximately $400.

[Exhibit 16-P; R452 at 136-37.]

All invoices showed that payment was effected with cash.
16-P.]

[Exhibit

The documents are therefore fully consistent with Heatonfs

testimony as to the approximate magnitude of his cash payments.
There was no evidence that any additional amounts were paid to
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Heaton for material purchases.

The trial court found that all of

the materials for which damages were awarded were stolen by
Heaton and not paid for.

[Finding of Fact til; R338.]

Hurst and Wasatch Steel, in addition to knowingly receiving
vast amounts of stolen steel, bribed Steelco's employees to cause
Steelco to pay fraudulently inflated amounts for steel purchased
from Wasatch Steel.

Hurst admitted paying kickbacks to Volma

Heaton but denied paying any kickbacks to Chris Williams.
Accordingly, the Heaton and Williams kickback situations will be
addressed separately.
Hurst admitted paying at least four kickbacks to Heaton.
[R450 at 90-92.]
trial.

Hurst was impeached with his deposition at

In his deposition, Hurst admitted that, at the time he

paid the kickbacks, he thought it was a "sleazy" practice, that
it caused his view of Heaton's integrity and honesty to drop, and
that Hurst would have immediately fired one of his own employees
if that employee accepted kickbacks under the very same circumstances -- Hurst explained that an employee's receipt of kickbacks was obviously not in the employer's best interest.
at 79-81, 89.]

[R450

In his trial testimony, Hurst changed his mind

and remarkably testified that, so long as the price of the
material was competitive, he would not care whether his employees
received secret kickbacks; indeed, he said he would be impressed
with their initiative! Mr. Hurst's extraordinarily conflicting
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and unbelievable trial and deposition testimony on this subject
is found at R450 at 78-89,

Hurst also said, on the one hand,

that the greater his profit margin, the greater the kickback he
would pay, but on the other hand, the fact that he paid the
kickback would not necessarily increase Steelco's cost of material.

[R454 at 147, 150-51.]

When asked if Hurst would have

sold Steelco the same material at his price less the kickback
amount (which would yield Wasatch Steel the exact same amount),
Hurst was not sure.

[Id.]

Hurst initially testified that Heaton was being paid only to
arrange the purchases and was not being paid to cause his employer
to pay an inflated price.

[R450 at 71-72.]

When he paid the

kickbacks, Hurst knew that Heaton was a participant in the
negotiations on behalf of Steelco to purchase the steel.
at 75.]

[R450

After first flatly denying it, Hurst finally admitted

that Heaton had told him "I need some commission [a kickback] to
get them [Steelco] to use this rough of material."
152-54.]

[R454 at

As will be seen, the material Hurst sold Steelco was

very rough --it was in large part unusable junk.
The kickbacks were as much as 25% of Wasatch Steel's margin -- a big chunk.

[Exhibit 28-P.]

One kickback transaction

will illustrate what is going on here. Wasatch Steel purchased
one load of junk steel at 8c per pound and immediately resold it
to Steelco for 13%C per pound -- Hurst received almost $2,000 for

-15-

in effect making the kickback telephone call.
did the delivering for Hurst.

Somebody else even

In return, Hurst paid Heaton l%c

per pound ($497.70) -- about 25% of Hurst's margin for causing
his employer to buy the junk.

[Exhibit 57-D; Exhibit 13-P, Tab

3.]
The materials that were sold under the kickback arrangements
were obviously bad.

To serve its purpose, the steel material on

which kickbacks were paid had to be unlaminated, relatively
smooth, and free of holes.

[R452 at 80, 85; R450 at 145.] The

materials that Hurst delivered were laminated, rough, of irregular
shapes, and had holes in them.

They were, in fact, junk.

[Exhibits 35-P through 44-P; R452 at 80-94.]
Volma Heaton testified that Hurst paid him at least four
kickbacks in addition to four admitted by Hurst, for a total of
at least eight kickbacks.

[Exhibit 13-P; R451 at 26-30.]

Although Hurst at trial admitted paying Heaton only four kickbacks, he also testified that he did not know whether the remaining four identified by Heaton were, or were not, kickbacks.
[R450 at 94-100.]

The additional four kickbacks, however, were

paid close in time to Steelco's purchase of the goods in question, all bear a precise mathematical relationship to the number
of pounds sold to Steelco, and all were identified by Heaton as
kickbacks.

[Exhibit 13-P; R451 at 26-30.]
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With respect to each kickback transaction, Heaton would call
Hurst on the telephone and indicate that he could cause Steelco
to purchase certain material.

Hurst would quote a price after

which Heaton and Hurst would agree to jack up that price and to
pay a portion of the increase back to Heaton as a kickback.
Heaton always told Hurst that Steelco was not: to know about their
arrangements and Hurst agreed to keep their arrangements secret.
[R451 at 23-24, 31-32.]

After their arrangements were complete,

Heaton would arrange for Steelco*s purchasing department to issue
a purchase order for the materials in question at the fraudulently
inflated price or, on occasion, Heaton would issue a purchase
order himself for the inflated price.

[R451 at 23-24.]

Steelcofs

purchasing department was never informed of the kickback arrangements.

[R451 at 31; R452 at 54.]

Chris Williams first became involved with Wasatch Steel by
assisting Heaton with his deliveries to Wasatch Steel on 8-12
occasions.

Heaton and Williams became friends, and Heaton told

Williams about his kickback arrangement with Wasatch Steel.
[R451 at 148-52.]

The trial court found that Wasatch Steel and

Hurst paid to Chris Williams kickbacks in a minimum aggregate
amount of $5,700 during 1986.

[Finding of Fact 132; R345.]

Chris Williams, like Volma Heaton, testified that she negotiated
with Hurst on Steelcofs steel purchases from Wasatch Steel, that
Hurst would initially quote a price, and that the price to be
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paid by Steelco was thereafter jacked up in connection with a
conversation in which Hurst agreed to pay a kickback to Chris
Williams.

[R451 at 152-53.]

Unlike Heaton, who was paid his

kickbacks by check, Williams was paid in cash.

Williams and

Hurst split the total amount of the price increase, with Williams
receiving about 80% and Hurst receiving about 20%.
187-90.]

[R451 at

It is not surprising that the procedure was similar for

both Heaton and Williams, since Heaton initially told Williams
about his obtaining kickbacks from Hurst.

[R451 at 151-52.]

Hurst, on the other hand, testified that he had never met or
seen Chris Williams prior to the initiation of this action.
[R450 at 108.]

Both Chris Williams and Volma Heaton testified

that Chris Williams accompanied Heaton on many of his delivery
trips to Wasatch Steel and that Heaton formally introduced Chris
Williams to Hurst on at least one occasion.

[R451 at 6, 148-50.]

Volma Heaton testified that Hurst joked to Heaton about an old
man like Heaton being with a pretty young woman like Chris
Williams.

[R451 at 6.]

Patty Midgley, another Steelco employee,

confirmed that Chris Williams knew Hurst during 1986 and that in
fact Hurst once greeted Chris Williams in the presence of Patty
Midgley at a movie theater.

[R452 at 28-30.]

In their statement of facts, defendants attempt to develop
minute and irrelevant mathematical disparities in the kickback
transactions.

These minor "disparities11 exist, however, only if
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Chris Williams was paid the exact amounts on the three exact
transactions identified by defendants, and no others.

Chris

Williams never testified that she was sure of the exact transactions on which she was paid kickbacks, that she was sure of the
precise amounts involved on any transaction, that she was sure of
the period of time during which she received the kickbacks, or
that she was sure of the number of kickbacks she was paid.

She

said she could not be sure of the details because the transactions occurred over four years ago. What she did say was that
she was sure she received a total of approximately $6,000 in
kickbacks, that she thought she received them in at least three
transactions, and that with respect to each, Hurst quoted a
selling price which was jacked up by an agreed amount which was
thereafter split between Chris Williams and Hurst.

[R451 at

152-53, 169, 186, 204-05.]
At trial, Wasatch Steel claimed that it never had enough
cash to pay Chris Williams what she claimed to have been paid.
Even defendants1 own self-serving summary shows that Wasatch
Steel deposited over $18,000 per month in cash.

[Exhibit 53-D.]

Hurst admitted that Wasatch Steel takes in about $120,000 per
month in revenue, but that he could not even estimate the percentage of that amount that was cash.
16-20.]

[Exhibit 50-P; R454 at

Whether businesses that knowingly receive stolen prop-

erty and pay bribes report all cash receipts is open to fair
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question.

Chris Williams received a total of only $6,000. As

Hurst testified, only he and his father-in-law, Bill Holtman,
handled cash.

[R450 at 34.]

Hurst's production at trial of information concerning cash
receipts is itself most interesting.

When asked about these very

same cash receipt records in his deposition, Hurst testified that
all of his

fl

records detailing cash transactions" were stolen at

the end of 1987, coincidentally within a very short time after
Hurst learned that Steelco was investigating Heaton's dealings
with Wasatch Steel.

[R454 at 120-26.]

Notwithstanding this

theft of "everything," and that as a result, he didn't "have any
records detailing cash transactions," Hurst was inexplicably able
to locate the same cash records that he claimed had been stolen
to prepare Exhibit 53-D and offer it into evidence as the only
evidence of his cash receipts.

[R454 at 119-21.]

When Hurst was

deposed prior to trial, however, he very clearly stated under
oath that all of Wasatch Steel's cash records were unavailable
because they had been stolen.

[R454 at 122-23.]

Hurst stated in

his deposition, "I don't have any records detailing cash transactions" for 1986.

[R454 at 123.] At trial, Hurst testified

that he researched his records and came up with a summary of cash
deposits for May, June, and July, 1986.

[R454 at 120.] Linda

Bryant, who Hurst testified was his bookkeeper, and from whom the
records were allegedly stolen, was not called by Wasatch Steel as
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a witness at trial to confirm the alleged theft.

It is not sur-

prising that the trial court chose not to believe Mr. Hurst in
all respects.
During mid-1986, Steelco discovered approximately $1,000 in
cash missing and conducted an investigation into the identity of
the thief.

Steelco ultimately satisfied itself that Chris

Williams was the party that had stolen the cash and fired her in
June of 1986.
Steel.

The cash thefts had nothing to do with Wasatch

At the time that Steelco fired Chris Williams, Steelco

had no knowledge of Volma Heaton?s thefts or Wasatch Steel's
kickbacks to Heaton and Williams.

[R452 at 122-23; R451 at

155-56.]
During December of 1987, Steelco for the first time learned
that Volma Heaton was stealing its steel products.
125-27.]

[R452 at

Bob Elkington, Steelco's chief executive, interviewed

Volma Heaton and learned that some of the material had been sold
to Wasatch Steel.

[R452 at 128-29.]

When Elkington contacted

Hurst to pursue the investigation further, Hurst refused to tell
him anything before he talked to his attorney.

[R452 at 130.]

Even though Hurst knew that Steelco was Heaton!s employer and
that Steelco was the party from which the steel came, he refused
to talk to Elkington, who he knew to be a Steelco management
person.

Before showing Elkington anything, Hurst first spoke to

Heaton.

[R450 at 101.]

After Heaton and Hurst talked, Heaton
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gave Bob Elkington a letter in which Heaton indicated that he and
Hurst had found that "he [Hurst] had paid me a total of $9,185.85"
and that "if you like please call Lynn and he can confirm this
amount."

[Exhibit 20-P; R452 at 130.]

The $9,185.85 figure was

a false number that was a small fraction of the amounts that
Wasatch Steel had in fact paid Heaton.

Elkington then called

Hurst, who confirmed the phony $9,185.85 number.
131-32.]

[R452 at

Nevertheless, Elkington insisted on seeing Wasatch

Steelfs records concerning the Heaton payments.

[R452 at 132.]

Hurst further delayed Elkingtonfs access to the records by
demanding Heaton!s written permission for Elkington to see the
records.

[R452 at 132.] When Elkington finally met with Hurst

on December 31, 1987, Hurst did not show him all of his records,
but only the receipts that he, Hurst, had himself pulled from the
records, year by year.

[R452 at 133.]

Elkington asked to see

Wasatch Steel's records for years prior to 1985, but Hurst said
the information was no longer available, which was false.
at 134; Exhibits 1-P and 2-P.]

[R452

Although Hurst at trial admitted

paying Heaton four kickbacks, he did not tell Elkington about any
of these kickbacks in December of 1987, even though he knew
Elkington was there to investigate the dishonest activities of
Heaton with Wasatch Steel.

[R450 at 106-07.]

One of the re-

ceipts that Hurst showed Elkington did happen to identify a
"commission" paid to Heaton in the amount of $85.44.
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[Exhibit

14-P; R450 at 104; Exhibit 4-P.]

There was no indication that

the "commission" related in any way to Steelcofs purchase of
materials.

Because of its insignificant amount and Elkingtonfs

assumption that it related to something unrelated that Heaton had
done for Wasatch Steel, Elkington thought nothing of it.
at 12.]

[R453

Although Elkington asked Hurst whether any other Steelco

employees were involved, Hurst did not identify Chris Williams,
even though she participated in the deliveries and was paid
kickbacks.

[R452 at 135.]

A few months later, Steelco and Heaton entered into a
Settlement Agreement under which Heaton repaid to Steelco a
portion of its losses and warranted that he had fully disclosed
all of his unlawful activities to Steelco.
at 138.]

[Exhibit 22-P; R452

That warranty was inaccurate in multiple respects. At

the time the agreement was signed, Steelco had no knowledge of
the kickbacks, of sales of stolen materials to others, or of
Wasatch Steel's complicity in Heatonfs thefts.

[R452 at 147.]

About six months later, on October 7, 1988, Chris Williams,
voluntarily and on her own initiative, contacted Elkington at
Steelco.

[R451 at 158; R452 at 141.]

Chris Williams had been a

drug addict who stole from Steelco during her employment to
support her habit.

After she was fired by Steelco for stealing

$1,000 in June, 1986, Williams in October, 1987 checked herself
into a drug treatment center and kicked her drug habit.
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[R451 at

155-57.]

As a part of her recovery, Chris Williams became active

in Alcoholics Anonymous.

After consultation with her counselors,

Chris Williams determined that it was important to make a full
disclosure to Steelco of the extent of her thefts, which she had
not done previously.

[R451 at 158, 200-01.]

Although she had

been fired two years earlier and had since had no contact with
Steelco, Chris Williams contacted Elkington and told him that she
desired to make full disclosure concerning her unlawful activities.

She explained to Elkington that the cash theft for which

she was fired was only a small amount of her unlawful receipts
and advised Steelco of her receipt of approximately $6,000 in
kickbacks.

She did not initially, however, advise Elkington of

the identity of the party paying the kickbacks.
R452 at 141-44.]

[R451 at 158;

In October, 1988, Chris Williams finally

identified Wasatch Steel as the party paying the kickbacks.
[R452 at 146.]

Until Chris Williams made this disclosure,

Steelco did not know that Wasatch Steel had paid kickbacks to
Heaton or that Wasatch Steel was knowingly acting improperly in
its dealings with Heaton.
Because of the revelation of Chris Williams that Heaton had
also been paid kickbacks and the discovery of other sales of
stolen steel by Heaton to additional previously undisclosed
parties, Steelco and Heaton rescinded the Settlement Agreement
between them and agreed that the amounts Heaton had previously
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paid to Steelco could be allocated to whatever losses that
Steelco had suffered as a result of Heaton's improper activities.
[R452 at 147-48; R451 at 45.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Heaton-Steelco Settlement Agreement Has no Effect

Upon Steelcofs Claims Against Defendants.
properly raised below.

This issue was not

The Settlement Agreement does not affect

Steelcofs claims against defendants and has, in any event, been
rescinded.
2.

Limitations Poses no Bar.

Limitations poses no bar

because defendants raised the limitations period below only
concerning the conversion claim, this action was filed within the
limitations period after plaintiffs1 discovery of its claims, and
defendants fraudulently concealed the facts from plaintiffs.
3.

The Court's Findings are Supported.

The trial court's

findings of fraud, conspiracy, and conversion are supported by
the evidence.
4.

The Measure and Calculation of Damages was Appropriate.

The trial court used the correct measure of damages, attorney's
fees are mandated here, and punitive damages in the amount
awarded are appropriate.
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5.

Steelco is Entitled to Recover Under the Racketeering

Enterprises Act.

The court's findings establish each element

necessary to establish a claim under this law.
6.

Steelco is Entitled to Recover Under the Receiving

Stolen Property Act.

The trial courtfs findings establish each

element required to recover under this law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE HEATON-STEELCO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
HAS NO EFFECT UPON STEELCO15 CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
Shortly following Steelcofs discovery of Volma Heatonfs
thefts, Steelco and Volma Heaton entered into a certain Settlement Agreement.

[Exhibit 22-P.]

That agreement provided:

9.
Agreement Not to Sue. If, but only
if, (a) Heaton timely pays and performs each
and every obligation under this Agreement and
under each instrument, document and agreement
delivered by Heaton to the Company [Steelco]
pursuant to this Agreement; and (b) all of
the representations and warranties of Heaton
set forth in this Agreement or otherwise made
to the Company are and remain true, accurate
and complete, the Company shall not initiate
or join in a lawsuit or any other action
against Heaton in connection with the wrongful and unlawful transactions and circumstances covered by this Agreement.
Wasatch Steel and Hurst argue that this provision amounts to a
release without reservation of a joint tortfeasor which under
Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4 operates to release all other joint
tortfeasors -- Hurst and Wasatch Steel. Wasatch Steel is wrong
upon a host of grounds.
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A

-

The Utah Joint Obligations Act Defense was not Properly

Presented Below.

Defendants argue that the Utah Joint Obliga-

tions Act, Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4, bars Steelco's recovery in
this case.

Defendants1 Amended Answer, in Second Affirmative

Defense, referred to the Settlement Agreement and alleged only
that

f,

[t]he Agreement contains no reservation of rights and

therefore constitutes a complete bar to Plaintiff's action.ff
[R88.]

The Amended Answer did not refer to Section 15-4-4 and

did not suggest that the defense was in any way premised upon the
release of a joint obligor.

Defendants1 final argument is

contained in its Memorandum and Argument, which makes absolutely
no reference to any such defense.

[R387.]

This Court normally will only consider questions which were
properly raised below.

E.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange,

164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 7 (Utah 1991); Loveland v. Orem City Corp.,
746 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987).

Even assuming that the Amended

Answer properly raised this theory, defendants' failure to argue
the theory to the trial court precludes their raising it for the
first time on appeal.

In Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis

Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982), plaintiff successfully
sued for breach of a covenant not to compete.

On appeal, the

defendants contended that the covenant not to compete was contrary to public policy.

The Supreme Court unanimously held:
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The defendants1 contention that the covenant
not to compete was contrary to public policy
was raised as a defense in their answer, but
no argument was made to the district court on
this issue and no evidence was presented.
This Court will not consider on appeal issues
which were not submitted to the trial court
and concerning which the trial court did not
have the opportunity to make any findings of
fact or law. JEd. at 672.
Defendants cannot be said to have given the district court an
opportunity to rule upon their unarticulated, unargued theory.
Under this Court's established rule, this theory of defense
should not be considered now.
B.
Tanto.

Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4 (1986) has Been Repealed Pro
Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4 provides in substance "that a

release of one joint obligor releases all other obligors unless
the injured party expressly reserves in writing its rights
against the other obligors." Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d
1349, 1350 (Utah 1986).

There is a clear conflict between that

statute and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-42 (1986), which was enacted
much later in time.

The latter provides:

A release given by a person seeking recovery
to one or more defendants does not discharge
any other defendant unless the release so
provides.
In Krukiewicz, the Supreme Court held that Section 78-27-42 is a
pro tanto repeal of Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4:
Section 78-27-42 is ffby necessary
implication" a pro tanto repeal of §15-4-4 of
the Joint Obligations Act, U.C.A., 1953,
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§15-4-1, to -7, which states that a release
of one joint obligor releases all other
obligors unless the injured party expressly
reserves in writing its rights against the
other obligors. Id. at 1350.
After explaining that Section 78-27-42 is derived from the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975),
the Court noted that n[a] primary purpose of the Uniform Act was
to change the common law rule so that release of one joint
tort-feasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." Id
at 1351.

Thus, the rule is settled in Utah that the Legisla-

ture's enactment of Section 78-27-42 repealed, pro tanto, Section
15-4-4, upon which Wasatch Steel exclusively relies.
The cases advanced by defendants in support of their argument that the release of one joint obligor without express
reservation of rights against other joint obligors releases the
others are all inapposite.

Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel,

Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972) was overruled by Krukiewicz.
Defendants incorrectly state that Krukiewicz overruled Holmstead
"on other grounds.11

The Krukiewicz Court stated that ff[t]he sole

issue on appeal is whether §78-27-42 of the Utah Comparative
Negligence Act overrules Holmstead."

Id. at 1350. The Krukiewicz

Court unanimously held that Section 15-4-4 was pro tanto repealed
and that Holmstead was thus overruled.

The issue involved in

Krukiewicz, Holmstead, and this case is identical.

The other

cases advanced by defendants in support of their argument that
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the release of one joint tortfeasor releases them all predate
Krukiewicz and come from other jurisdictions.

Many deal with the

separate issue of whether plaintiff can make a double recovery,
and none are directly on point.

The only two Utah cases in

addition to Holmstead cited by defendants apply Utah Code Ann.
§15-4-2, not 15-4-4, and stand for the proposition that the
plaintiff cannot make a double recovery, not for the proposition
that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all joint
tortfeasors.

See Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 769

P.2d 809 (Utah 1988) and Western Steel Co. v. Travel Batcher
Corp., 663 P.2d 82 (Utah 1983).
Krukiewicz also defeats defendantsf argument that the
Comparative Negligence Act does not apply to intentional torts.
The Krukiewicz Court stated:
Section 78-27-40(3), patterned after the 1939
Uniform Act, defines a joint tort-feasor in
terms of liability, not negligence: Joint
tort-feasor means Mone of two or more persons, jointly or severally liable in
tort. . . ." Id. at 1351.
Thus, despite its name, the Utah Comparative Negligence Act
applies no matter what theory of liability is advanced by the
plaintiff.

Krukiewicz at 1352.

Section 15-4-4 is a codification of an old common law rule
that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all others
unless the injured party reserves its rights against the other
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joint tortfeasors.

Krukiewicz at 1350. The harsh, illogical old

common law rule has, however, fallen into disfavor.

Recognizing

that a party should be deemed to release "only those other
parties whom he intends to release," the United States Supreme
Court has repudiated the common law rule.

Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971).

The Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts has also abandoned the old common law
rule:
A valid release of one tortfeasor from
liability for a harm, given by the injured
person, does not discharge others liable for
the same harm, unless it is agreed that it
will discharge them. Restatement (Second) of
Torts, §885(1) (1977).
Since the rule that is codified in Section 15-4-4 has been
generally abandoned, it would make no sense for this Court to
reexamine its determination that Section 15-4-4 is no longer
effective.
C.

The Covenant Not to Sue Never Became Effective. As

quoted above, Steelco's covenant not to sue Heaton became effective "if, but only if, . . . all of the representations and
warranties of Heaton set forth in this Agreement or otherwise
made to [Steelco] are and remain true, accurate and complete."
[Exhibit 22-P 19.]

As the trial court found, Heaton's warranty

in paragraph 1 that he had fully disclosed all of his wrongful
and unlawful activities was false when made.
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[Findings of Fact

KK54, 55; R355.]

The court's finding is abundantly supported by

the evidence that, among other things, Heaton substantially
understated his deliveries to Wasatch Steel and All Star
Manufacturing, Heaton was paid undisclosed kickbacks, and Heaton
sold substantial stolen steel to previously undisclosed parties,
including Davis Supply and Mr. Trailer.

These breaches are fully

detailed and supported at pages 35-38 of this brief.
Since Heaton's warranties in the Settlement Agreement were
false, by the very terms of paragraph 9, the covenant not to sue
never became operative, and no "release" of any joint tortfeasor
occurred.
D.

A Covenant Not to Sue Does Not Constitute a Release.

Even if Section 15-4-4 is resurrected, and even if the covenant
not to sue somehow became operative notwithstanding Heatonfs
false warranties, nevertheless the covenant did not constitute a
"release."

Many jurisdictions have adopted a covenant not to sue

as a device for evading the now-discredited common law rule that
a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. Annotation,
Release of One Joint Tortfeasor as Discharging Liability of
Others:

Modem Trends, 73 A.L.R. 2d 403, 418 (1960).

Restatement adopts this view as well:

The

"A covenant not to sue one

tortfeasor or not to proceed further against him does not discharge any other tortfeasor liable for the same harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts §885(2) (1977).
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The Court in Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F.
Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1959), applying Utah law, held:
Satisfaction of judgment against one of two
or more joint and several obligors will bar
an action against the remaining obligors. On
the other hand, a mere covenant not to sue
one joint and several obligor does not
release the remaining obligors. Ld. at 160.
Similarly, in United States v. First Security Bank, 208 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1953), the Court implied that a covenant not to sue is
not "an outright release from liability11 and "does not bar an
action against other joint tortfeasors." ^Id. at 428. Two Utah
Supreme Court opinions also implicitly recognize that a covenant
not to sue does not release other joint tortfeasors when the
plaintiff has not gained full satisfaction of his claims. In
Green v. Lang Co., 206 P.2d 626 (Utah 1949), the Utah Supreme
Court allowed a plaintiff to pursue a second joint obligor after
the plaintiff had executed a covenant not to sue the first. In
Dawson v. Board of Education, 222 P.2d 590 (Utah 1950), the Court
elaborated on the characteristics of a covenant not to sue which
distinguish it from a complete release:

f,

In a true covenant not

to sue, the amount of damages is uncertain, the party does not
intend to fix the loss by the agreement, and full satisfaction is
not admitted."

Id. at 593 (emphasis added).

The covenant not to

sue Heaton, even if effective, does not operate to bar claims
against joint tortfeasors under Section 15-4-4.

-33-

E.

The Settlement Agreement was Rescinded.

The trial

court found that Steelco and Heaton agreed to rescind the
Settlement Agreement and that Steelco was entitled to do so even
absent the agreement of Heaton because of Heatonfs misrepresentations and omissions.

[Finding of Fact 155; R355.] The

rescission agreement is marked as Exhibit 24-P.

By the terms of

paragraph 1 of that agreement, the Settlement Agreement was rescinded in its entirety.

Wasatch Steel implausibly argues that

all of the parties to the Settlement Agreement could not rescind
it, but offers no authority for this obviously incorrect proposition.

It is true that the rescission agreement was executed

after the filing of this lawsuit, but it is also true that the
issue of the rescission was tried with the consent of both
parties and the court made specific findings upon that issue.
Wasatch Steel next argues that no consideration supported
Heaton!s agreement to rescind.

First, the law does not require

consideration to support a rescission, and Wasatch Steel offers
no authority to the contrary.

Second, by rescinding both

parties1 obligations under the Settlement Agreement, Heaton was
relieved of multiple obligations under the Settlement Agreement
which provide ample consideration, even were it required.

Heaton

was relieved of his warranties under paragraph 1, Heaton was
relieved of the confession of judgment appearing in paragraph 3,
Heaton was relieved of his assignment of amounts due him under
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paragraph 5, Heaton was relieved of his noncompetition agreement
in paragraph 7, and Heaton was relieved of his indemnification
obligations under paragraph 10. There was plenty of consideration, if consideration is required.
Defendants remarkably argue at pages 33-34 of their brief
that Heaton!s warranties were not inaccurate or false. Defendants1 statements are absolutely contrary to the court's findings
and to the record.

The trial court found that Heaton!s warranty

that he had fully disclosed all of his wrongful and unlawful
activities in steel sales to Steelco was false.

[Finding of Fact

154; R355.]
In the Settlement Agreement, Heaton warranted "that the
schedule attached to this Agreement as Exhibit A is true, accurate and complete and sets forth the full and complete details of
each and every transaction and circumstance in which Heaton was
involved during his employment by the Company [Steelco] in which
Heaton acted wrongfully or unlawfully. . . .ff Following are some
of the respects in which Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement
was inaccurate and incomplete:
First, Exhibit A indicates that Heaton received only
$10,718.70 through his sale of materials to All Star Manufacturing.

As the court found, Heaton sold more than double that

amount to All Star Manufacturing -- a total of $24,789.55.
[Finding of Fact 157; R356; Exhibit 29-P (which computes the
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total value of the subject steel in relation to the amounts paid
to Heaton).]

Heaton testified that All Star or its owner, Jim

Shaw, paid him in cash the total sum of $8,657.97.
34-35; Exhibit 19-P.]

[R451 at

In addition to that cash, Heaton testified

that Shaw and/or All Star traded him trailers and trailer parts
valued at between $12,000 and $15,000 for additional steel he
stole from Steelco.

[R451 at 35-37,]

This testimony was un-

disputed.
Second, Exhibit A estimated Heaton1s sales to Wasatch Steel
during 1983 and 1984 to be $5,000.

As the evidence reflects,

Heaton was paid almost double that amount during 1983 and 1984.
[Exhibit 27-P.]

Wasatch Steel asserts at page 33 of its brief

that, with respect to sales during 1983 and 1984, Elkington was
told that the 1983 and 1984 documents would be made available at
a more convenient time and with Heatonfs authorization.

No

citation to the record is found because the record does not
support that assertion.

Elkington testified that he requested

those records and Hurst told him that they were no longer available.

[R452 at 134.]

Hurst testified that he didn't show the

1983 and 1984 records to Elkington because Heaton had not given
his permission.

[R450 at 104.]

If that were true, why wouldn!t

Elkington have sought Heatonfs permission, which was given when
requested for 1985 records?

[R452 at 134.]
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It makes no sense.

Third, Heaton did not disclose to Steelco that he had
received kickbacks in an aggregate amount of over $4,000 from
Wasatch Steel.

[Exhibit 28-P.]

Heaton disclosed none of those

kickbacks in the Settlement Agreement.

Wasatch Steel argues that

because Hurst showed Bob Elkington a receipt showing a "commission'1 for less than $100 which had no indication that it was a
kickback or even concerned Steelco, somehow Steelco was charged
with knowledge of all of the kickbacks paid by Wasatch Steel,
even though the evidence is undisputed that Steelco was not aware
of them.

Even with respect to the vague, minuscule "commission"

payment of ninety-odd dollars that was shown to Elkington,
Elkington testified that he assumed that Heaton had been paid for
doing something else for Wasatch Steel and that he thought
nothing of it.

[R453 at 12.]

Although Elkington did concede

that it was possible that he talked to Hurst about this "commission," even though he did not recall it, he was sure that any
such conversation did not lead him to believe that Wasatch Steel
was paying Heaton for arranging Steelco1s purchases at inflated
prices.

[R453 at 12.]

In Hurst's version of his conversation

with Elkington, he never mentioned any discussion on the subject
of commissions.

[R450 at 102-07; R454 at 92-98.]

Everyone

agrees that Hurst did not disclose at least seven kickbacks to
Elkington, which amounted to about $4,000.
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Fourth, although Exhibit A identifies only Wasatch Steel and
All Star Manufacturing as the parties to whom Heaton sold steel,
Elkington learned, later, that Heaton was also selling steel to
Mr. Trailer and Davis Supply.

[R452 at 147.]

As the foregoing reflects, Wasatch Steel's statement that
Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement was accurate is simply and
demonstrably wrong.

Each of the four misrepresentations and

omissions in Exhibit A are uncontested.

There was ample basis

for rescission.
II.

LIMITATIONS POSES NO BAR

As the statement of facts above reflects, Wasatch Steel and
Hurst perpetrated an integrated fraud upon Steelco.

Wasatch

Steel and Hurst bribed Steelcofs employees and conspired with
Heaton to systematically steal from Steelco its remnant material.
An essential ingredient of that fraudulent scheme, as the trial
court found, was concealment of these outrageous arrangements
from Steelco, a concealment in which Wasatch Steel and Hurst
actively participated.

Defendants now incredibly argue that

Steelco1 s claims should be barred because they were so successful
in concealing from Steelco the fraud that was being perpetrated
upon it.
Steelco sought recovery for the same losses based upon five
theories -- conversion, fraud, conspiracy, racketeering, and
receiving stolen property.

The court found separately the
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damages recoverable by Steelco for the stolen steel and the
kickback transactions under the conversion, fraud, and conspiracy
theories.

The damages recoverable under the racketeering and

receiving stolen property statutes have already been found by the
trial court, although recovery was denied upon legal grounds that
Steelco challenges below.

Thus, even if Wasatch Steel is suc-

cessful in persuading the Court that the limitations period has
expired with respect to part of Steelcofs conversion claim,
Steelco is nevertheless entitled to recover for the same loss
under its fraud, conspiracy and remaining claims, with respect to
which there is unquestionably no limitations defense.
A.

The Limitations Issue was not Properly Raised Below.

Although defendants in their Amended Answer pleaded the limitations periods prescribed in Section 78-12-25 and -26 [R89],
defendants1 arguments to the court addressed only limitations
with respect to the conversion claim.

[R405.]

As indicated

above at pages 27-28, even if a defense is raised in a party's
pleading, unless the matter is presented to the court for decision in argument to enable the court to address the subject, the
defense is not properly presented on appeal. Accordingly, by not
properly raising them below, all limitations arguments other than
those that may relate to the conversion claim should not be
considered on appeal.
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B.

As to all of Steelco*s Claims, Limitations Runs From

Discovery.

The limitations period for fraud is three years and

M

the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the

discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud. . . ." Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3).
defendants that

Steelco agrees with

!!

[i]n an action based on civil conspiracy, the

applicable statute of limitations is determined by the nature of
the action in which the conspiracy is alleged.11
Brief at 35.]

[Wasatch Steel

As the statement of facts makes clear, the nature

of the action in which this conspiracy occurred is clearly one of
fraud.

Thus, Steelcofs conspiracy claim is governed by the same

limitations period as the fraud limitations period, which runs
upon discovery.

The limitations period with respect to the tort

of conversion is three years as set forth in Section 78-12-26(2).
That limitations period is the only one before the Court that is
not made by statute expressly to run from discovery.

Under the

circumstances presented here, as the trial court found, the
discovery rule should apply to all theories.

[R351.]

The Supreme Court has firmly embraced the doctrine that the
limitations period may begin to run when a party discovers the
facts giving rise to his claim.
P.2d 435 (Utah 1968).

E.g., Christiansen v. Rees, 436

In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah

1981), the Supreme Court held that the discovery rule is based on
a balancing test and is applied when f,[t]he hardship the statute
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of limitations would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances
of that case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from
difficulties of proof caused by damage caused by the passage of
time."

Id., at 87.

In the Myers case, the Supreme Court con-

cluded that because (i) defendant could not establish prejudice
by having to defend a stale claim since

ff

his problems of proof

occasioned by the delay are no greater than the plaintiffsf" and
(ii) "plaintiffs could not file an action for damages or even
initiate investigative efforts to determine the cause of a
[claim] of which they had no knowledge."

Ld. at 87. Similarly,

in Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990), the Court
applied the discovery rule to a case of surveyor negligence,
reasoning that, on balance, the prejudice to the claimant in
having its claim barred outweighed the prejudice to the surveyoi
in that the surveyor could still testify although his crew's
memories had dimmed and their survey notes were no longer available.

See also Maughan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381,

1386 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying Utah law) and Merkley v. Beaslin,
778 P.2d 16 (Utah App. 1989) (discovery rule applied in legal
malpractice case).

The trial court found all of the facts

determined in Klinger and Myers to mandate application of the
discovery rule here.
The trial court specifically found that the discovery rule
should be applied in this case.

[R351.]
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The trial court based

that finding upon its determination that the hardship that any
limitations would otherwise impose upon Steelco outweighs any
prejudice to Wasatch Steel and Hurst from difficulties of proof
caused by the passage of time.

The court specifically found that

Wasatch Steel and Hurst could not establish any prejudice from
having to defend a stale claim since the proof in this case was
more accessible to them than to Steelco, the proof in substantial
part was derived from defendants1 own records and testimony, and
defendants affirmatively concealed the facts from Steelco over an
extended period of time. The court further found that Steelco
could not file any action or even initiate investigative efforts
to determine the existence of its causes of action since prior to
discovery Steelco had no knowledge of its claims or any reason to
suspect any claims existed.
Defendants' argument that the discovery rule should not
apply in this case appears at pages 42-43 of their brief. There,
defendants do not challenge the court's factual findings, other
than inferentially, but instead advance unsupported and conelusory statements that are contrary to the court's findings.
When an appellant assails the sufficiency of evidence supporting
the trial court's findings of fact, it has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings
and then demonstrating that the findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
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E.g. ,

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989);
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

When an

appellant fails to carry its burden of marshaling the evidence,
the appellate courts have refused to consider the merits of
challenges to findings and have accepted the findings as valid.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989).
The trial court's findings are, however, amply supported by
the evidence.

The dates of delivery and amounts of stolen steel

that was fraudulently acquired or converted by defendants were
proved by defendants' own records.
5-P, and 6-P.]

[Exhibits 1-P, 2-P, 3-P, 4-P,

The only party who dealt on behalf of defendants

with the transactions giving rise to these claims was Hurst, who
was Wasatch Steel's general manager and controlling personality.
Defendants therefore were not prejudiced in their defense by any
lack of evidence.

It is uncontested that Steelco had no knowl-

edge of its claims or any reason to suspect that such claims
existed until November of 1987 (with respect to the stolen steel)
and October of 1988 (with respect to the kickbacks).

Clearly,

Steelco could not have filed any action until it discovered its
claims.

The extensive evidence supporting the court's finding

that defendants fraudulently concealed their unlawful activities
is set forth below at pages 49-52.
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Defendants disingenuously suggest that there are no "exceptional circumstances'1 that warrant application of the discovery
rule here.

If a party, through fraud and conspiracy, can avoid

liability for the damages caused by its activities by successfully misleading and deceiving the injured party and by concealing its fraud, then Steelco respectfully submits that there can
be no circumstance sufficiently exceptional to mandate the
application of the discovery rule.

The Supreme Court has applied

the discovery rule in far less exceptional circumstances.
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978) (defendant
misled plaintiff regarding leaky pipe); Merkley, supra (legal
malpractice); Klinger, supra (surveyor negligence).
In summary, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, each
fact necessary to the application of the discovery rule in this
case.

Defendants have not challenged, properly or at all, those

findings by the court.

In any event, the court's findings are

amply supported by the evidence.
C.

Steelco did not Discover Either the Steel Thefts or the

Kickbacks Within the Limitations Period.

In paragraph 46 of its

Findings of Fact, the court found that Steelco did not know and
could not with reasonable diligence have learned of the facts
giving rise to its claims against defendants arising from the
stolen steel until at least November of 1987 and from the payment
of kickbacks to Heaton and Williams until October of 1988.
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[R350-51.]

Defendants attack this finding at: pages 40-41 of

their brief.

As indicated above, the appellant has the burden of

marshaling all of the evidence in support of the court's decision
and, if the appellant fails to do so, this Court need not consider
those challenges and shall presume the court's findings to be
supported by the evidence.

In this section of defendants1 brief,

only one citation to the record appears, and it is misleading.
Here is what defendants offer as the only record-supported
evidence that plaintiffs exercised no diligence:
. . . Steelco left its Superintendent in a
position where he could do "almost . . . what
he wanted'1 with the scrap material that
plaintiff is now suddenly concerned about.
[R.450 at 184.]
Here is an exact quotation of the record, which is the testimony
of Heaton's supervisor, Leon Hansen:
Q.

He could almost do what he wanted over
there, couldn't he?

A.

That is correct, yes.

Further down on the same page, Mr. Hansen testified that as to
scrap, Heaton could have acquired 100 pounds of scrap, so long as
it was for his own use.

[R450 at 184.]

Neither Leon Hansen nor

any other Steelco employee testified that Heaton could do whatever he wanted with the scrap.

On the contrary, all Steelco

employees, including Heaton, testified that employees could
purchase material only for their own use and were required to
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follow usual paperwork procedures in their purchases. The
remaining factual assertions contained at pages 40-41 (which
include no citation to the record) are contrary to the record.
The trial court's findings as to the discovery and discoverability of Steelcofs claims are amply supported by the record.
Steelco!s policy allowed its employees to purchase material for
themselves at cost for their own use and required that such
employee sales had to be documented in the ordinary course.
[R450 at 126-27.]

Heaton, from time to time, purchased material

and followed those procedures.

[R450 at 128-29; Exhibit 16-P.]

When a Steelco supervisor on one occasion noticed that Heaton had
failed properly to follow the paperwork procedures, he was issued
a written warning.

[Exhibit 18-P.] Heaton never spoke with his

supervisors about purchasing materials and reselling those materials.

[R450 at 137.] When Heatonfs supervisor learned that

Heaton was improperly removing material from Steelco, he was
immediately fired.

[R450 at 137.] When Steelcofs employees were

aware that material was being loaded for Heaton, Heaton created
phony paperwork that indicated he had purchased the material from
Steelco.

That paperwork was thereafter destroyed by Heaton.

[R450 at 203-04.]

Heaton generally loaded the steel himself from

the shop after Steelcofs business hours, which concluded at 3:30.
The shop, however, did not close at 3:30 -- there was a second
shift in the processing and loading department, which was not
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Heaton!s supervisor,

supervised by anyone other than Heaton.

Leon Hansen, was not located in the shop area where Heaton loaded
the steel -- he was located a block away.

On those few occasions

when Steelco personnel saw Heaton loading steel into his truck,
he told them he was buying the steel.

[R451 at 100-05.]

When

Steelcofs trucks (rather than Heatonfs truck) were involved in
delivering steel to Wasatch Steel, Heaton arranged, with Hurst,
to pay Steelco for a fraction of the total payment, which led
Steelco to believe that it was being paid for all of the steel.
[R451 at 113-15.]
Discovering Heaton1s thefts was all the more difficult to
discover because he did not steal uncut new material; rather, he
stole the remnant material.

The pieces of steel that remained

after new stock pieces were cut to size could be either remnant
or scrap.

Scrap went into scrap tubs and was sold to scrap

dealers and remnant went into remnant racks and was to be used in
Steelcofs own operation.

[R450 at 118.]

Obviously, keeping

track of whether remnant material was disappearing was virtually
an impossible undertaking.
The amount of steel stolen by Heaton, although large in
absolute terms, was a minuscule percentage of the steel that
passed through Steelcofs facility during the same period.

Heaton

stole steel over a four calendar year period and received in the
aggregate from Hurst just over $38,000 for the stolen steel.
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[Exhibit 27-P.]

Heaton was paid on the order of 8c per pound for

the stolen steel.

[Exhibit 6-P.]

Thus, Heaton stole on the

order of 475,000 pounds of steel over a four year period.

On the

other hand, 10-12 million pounds of steel is purchased and dealt
with by Steelco each year [R452 at 41] -- on the order of 48
million pounds in four years.

The steel stolen by Heaton was

therefore less than one percent of the steel dealt with by
Steelco during the same period.
Upon the first suggestion to Steelco!s management of impropriety, management immediately commenced a thorough investigation which ultimately resulted in the discovery of Heaton1s
thefts.

[R452 at 124-33.]

With respect to the kickback transactions, Heaton never
inquired whether it would be permissible for him to receive a
kickback for arranging steel purchases from his supervisor.
[R450 at 141.]

Heaton's supervisor was not aware that Heaton was

receiving kickbacks from Wasatch Steel.

[R450 at 141.] Chris

Williams worked for Alene Lamoreaux, Steelco1s purchasing agent.
Ms. Lamoreaux was not aware that Heaton and Chris Williams were
receiving kickbacks on Steelco1s purchases from Wasatch Steel.
[R452 at 54, 75.]

The first occasion upon which Steelco!s

management learned of any kickbacks being paid to anyone was in
October, 1988, when Chris Williams voluntarily came forward and
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told Bob Elkington of the practice.

[R451 at 158; R452 at

141-46.]
In summary, the trial court's finding that Steelco did not
know and could not with reasonable diligence have learned of the
facts giving rise to its claims with respect to the stolen steel
until at least November of 1987 and with respect to the kickback
transactions until October of 1988 is amply support by the
record.

Steelco had every reason to act upon any indication that

its steel was being stolen or that its employees were accepting
bribes . There is no evidence that Steelco received any such
indication prior to the dates found by the trial court. Also
contributing to the inability of Steelcofs management earlier to
discover these activities is the affirmative concealment practiced by defendants, which is detailed in the section that
follows.
D.

Defendants Concealed from Steelco its Cause of Action.

The trial court found that the limitations period was tolled
because Wasatch Steel and Hurst fraudulently concealed from
Steelco its claims.

[Finding of Fact 148; R352.]

In that

finding, the trial court identified various respects in which
defendants acted to conceal their unlawful activities from
Steelco.

Those findings are all supported by the record.

One obviously sufficient circumstance of fraudulent concealment was the very fact of defendants1 entering into a conspiracy
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with Heaton and Chris Williams, as the court found, to engage in
these unlawful activities and to keep them secret from plaintiffs.

[Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 42, 43; R339 at 349-50. ] In

addition, any act done by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the
common plan is the act of all, and each actor is responsible for
such act.
(1965).

E.g., Vaughan v. Hornaman, 195 Kan. 291, 403 P.2d 948

See, Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah

App. 1987), cert, dismissed, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989).

The

Supreme Court has also recognized that the concealing acts of
defendants1 privies or insurance adjuster can toll the limitations period.
(Utah 1969).

Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 163
Since Wasatch Steel and Hurst conspired with

Williams and Heaton and since Williams and Heaton are defendants1
privies for this purpose, the concealment acts of Heaton and
Williams are attributed to Wasatch Steel and Hurst. Further,
Wasatch Steel and Hurst, on their own, committed acts of concealment .
The steel was stolen after Steelcofs regular business hours,
when the entire Steelco plant other than the separate fabrication
plant that Heaton supervised was closed.

[R451 at 1, 103-04.]

On the extremely limited occasions upon which Heaton was seen
loading material by Steelcofs management, Heaton assured them
that he was purchasing the material.

[R451 at 103.] When

Steelco personnel were involved in the loading or delivery of the
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steel, Heaton created phony paperwork to suggest that the steel
was being legitimately purchased and thereafter destroyed it.
[R450 at 203-04.]

Hurst and Heaton agreed that their dealings

would be kept secret and that Heaton would not tell Steelcofs
management what was going on.

[R451 at 7-8.]

Hurst conducted

his dealings with Heaton in such a manner as to prevent Steelcofs
management from learning of those arrangements.
R454 at 143-44.]

[R450 at 68-70;

All of Hurst's meetings with Heaton at

Steelco!s premises were clandestine -- Hurst's conduct led
Steelcofs personnel to believe that Hurst was only a social
acquaintance.

[R450 at 68-70; R452 at 25-26, 79-80.]

On those

occasions when Steelcofs trucks were involved in deliveries to
Wasatch Steel, Hurst and Wasatch Steel arranged to cut checks to
Steelco for a small portion of the material and to Heaton for the
other portion, misleading Steelco to believe that it was being
paid for all of the steel that its trucks and employees removed
from Steelcofs premises.

[R451 at 4-5.]

With respect to the

kickback transactions, Heaton always told Hurst that Steelco was
not to know about these arrangements and Hurst agreed to keep the
arrangement secret.

[R451 at 23-24, 31-32.]

Hurst never spoke

to Steelco's management about the kickbacks that he paid to
Heaton and Chris Williams, even though, by his own testimony, at
the time he paid the kickbacks, he thought it was a !fsleazyM
practice and that he would have immediately fired one of his own
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employees if they had received a kickback under the same circumstances.

Although the foregoing is plainly sufficient, addi-

tional evidence of fraudulent concealment is discussed below at
pages 57-61.
III.
A.

THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED

The Trial Court Properly Entered its Findings Which are

Entitled to a Presumption of Propriety.

At pages 44-47 of their

brief, defendants suggest that counsel, and not the court, found
the facts in this case, that the court was unilaterally hostile
towards defendants, and that the trial judge abandoned his duties
as a judge to find for plaintiffs.

Defendants are wrong as a

matter of law and as a matter of fact,
1.

Standard of Review.

Rule 52(a) provides in part

that ''findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

A finding is clearly erroneous only if this Court

concludes that the finding is against the great weight of evidence.

Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); Reid v.

Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

The review-

ing court accords the trial court substantial deference to
determine the credibility of the witnesses.
P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987).
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State v. Wright, 744

2.

The Trial Court Showed no Hostility to Defendants.

A review of the record cited in defendants1 brief will make
crystal clear that defendants are misleading this Court as to
their claim of hostility.

Prior to the court's statement to Mr.

Garrett that "well, I have made my judgment, Mr. Garrett,1' which
defendants suggest constitutes hostility, Mr. Garrett stated to
the court:
Perhaps, Your Honor would not care to hear
this, but I was astonished that Your Honor
would accept the testimony of Chris Williams.
It was totally unbelievable in my judgment.
[R455 at 13; Defendants' Brief at 46, n.6.]
Defendants complain that the trial court expressed concern that,
after Lynn Hurst testified under oath in his deposition that all
of his cash records had been stolen, he nevertheless was able to
locate the same cash records to offer into evidence.
127-28; Defendants1 Brief at 46, n.6.]

[R454 at

Defendants' claim of

trial court hostility is devoid of support.
3.

The Trial Court Made its Findings Based Upon Clear

and Convincing Evidence.

In its Memorandum Decision, the court

stated that it found by a "preponderance of the evidence" the
facts.

The findings ultimately entered by the court were based

upon clear and convincing evidence.
in this procedure.

Defendants claim some error

Prior to the court's entry of its findings,

the court held a hearing to address that and related issues. At
that hearing, the court stated as follows:
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In this particular case, as I just sat
in there and dictated, I did in fact, as I
reviewed my Memorandum Decision, it is true
it stated that I was finding from a preponderance of the evidence. It is amazing
because I usually never say one way or
another and I don't know why those words
rolled up. But there is no question in my
mind that I made my findings based upon clear
and convincing evidence, and therefore the
words I used in that regard, in regards to
certain of those findings, really that
memorandum must be amended because that was
not what I intended and my findings were
based upon clear and convincing evidence.
[R455 at 2.]
Thereafter, the court entered the findings, based upon clear and
convincing evidence.

Defendants1 request that this Court find

error in the standard applied by the trial court requires that
the trial court be disbelieved.
4.

The Court Made its own Findings. At pages 44-47

of their brief, defendants inaccurately suggest that the trial
court mechanically adopted findings submitted by plaintiffs'
counsel.

The Supreme Court addressed the entry of findings in

Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).

In that case,

plaintiffs on appeal asserted that the trial court erred in
"adopting the findings of fact as prepared by the defendant
without any modification or change."

JA. at 1113. The Supreme

Court stated:
The court may ask counsel to submit findings
to aid the court in making the necessary
findings for the particular case. While we
do not recommend that the trial judge "me-
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chanically adopt11 the findings as prepared by
the prevailing party, we certainly do not
find such to be the fact in this case. After
the proposed fffindingsM were submitted by
defendants' counsel, the plaintiff filed objections and proposed amendments which were
argued before the trial court who ultimately
adopted the findings as submitted. The
discretion of adopting the findings as
submitted to the trial court is exclusively
in that court as long as the findings are not
clearly contrary to the evidence. We find no
error in this regard. Id. at 1113-14.
The trial court in this case did far more in preparing findings
than did the trial court in the Boyer case. After trial, the
court entered an unusually detailed nine page Memorandum Decision
containing 27 numbered findings.

[R273.]

In those findings, the

court found each material element to the defendants1 liability
under three theories and rejected liability under two theories.
At paragraph 27, the court stated that its decision was not
intended to include all necessary findings and directed plaintiffs1 counsel to prepare findings, conclusions, and a judgment
and "in doing so will add those additional facts, established by
the evidence, that are supportive of this Memorandum Decision."
Plaintiffs1 counsel then submitted proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the court.

Defendants then filed

39 pages of objections to those findings, which in the main
consisted of their disagreement with the court's decision.
[R283.]

The court later held a hearing at which the parties

argued their respective positions on the findings and con-
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elusions.

[R455.]

The court thereafter entered an order reject-

ing defendants1 objections and amending its Memorandum Decision
to state that the court had made its findings by clear and
convincing evidence.

[R376.]

Judge Russon did not mechanically adopt anything.

The

findings were his own.
B.
Findings.

Defendants Have Improperly Challenged the Court's
As indicated above in section II.A., when an appellant

fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate courts have refused
to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and have
accepted them as valid.

Defendants1 challenge to the courtfs

findings generally presents only testimony that was disbelieved
by the trial court, that tends not to support the trial court's
findings, and that lacks citations to the record. Defendants'
clear failure to marshal the evidence should result in this
Court's refusal to consider defendants' challenge.
Defendants' challenge to the trial court's findings requires
that the trial court believe Lynn Hurst and disbelieve virtually
every other witness in one respect or another. Mr. Hurst, who
repeatedly bribed Steelcofs employees, who lied in his deposition
saying that all of his cash records had been stolen to avoid
producing them for Steelco's inspection, who testified at trial
to the opposite of what he testified to in his deposition, again
and again, and who, while under oath at trial, testified that he

approves of the practice of paying kickbacks, is a person that,
we submit, should not be believed.

The trial court obviously did

not believe him.
C.

The Court's Findings are Supported.

At pages 48-61 of

their brief, defendants challenge four of the court's findings,
each of which is addressed in turn below.
1.

Defendants Knew of the Fraud and Conspiracy.

Both

the court's Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact that
were ultimately entered specifically found that defendants knew
of the fraud that was being perpetrated upon Steelco.

At pages

48-50, defendants challenge that finding.
Defendants suggest at pages 49-50 that two quotations
from Heaton1s testimony establish that Heaton and Hurst never
discussed the fact that the steel was stolen.

In the first

quotation, which is indented, Heaton indicated only that when he
first started dealing with Hurst, Heaton indicated that he was
buying and reselling the steel to him.

Defendants1 statement

that Heaton again affirmed that the subject was never brought up
again is inaccurate.
The statement of facts above sets forth the evidence
establishing that defendants had knowledge of the fraud being
perpetrated upon Steelco.

That evidence included evidence that

Heaton repeatedly reminded Hurst that his deliveries of stolen
steel were to be kept secret and Hurst agreed to secrecy.
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It is

implausible to believe that Hurst thought his dealings with
Heaton were aboveboard when Heaton went to great lengths to keep
their dealings private, when Hurst misled Steelco employees to
believe that Hurst was a personal friend, and when Hurst never
dealt with anyone at Steelco other than Heaton.
The purchase and delivery process were suspicious in
the extreme.
hours.

Virtually all deliveries were after Steelcofs

Hurst picked out the remnants he wanted from Steelcofs

remnant racks and paid only a fraction of their value for them.
A person in the steel business would know that the remnant was
used by Steelco and was not for sale. Wasatch Steel paid both
Steelco and Heaton for exactly the same kinds of materials in the
amounts directed by Heaton even though all of the steel came from
Steelco.

There is no rational explanation why Steelco would sell

part and Heaton would sell part of a series of loads -- Hurst!s
splitting the payments between Steelco and Heaton on loads
involving Steelco personnel was an obvious effort to mislead
Steelco into believing that it was being paid for its steel.
Defendants1 position on appeal is premised almost
exclusively upon their claimed reliance upon Heaton as an all
powerful supervisor of Steelco1s shop.

Defendants claim that

they were convinced of Heatonfs bona fides and of his authority
to be paid for huge amounts of steel removed from his employer!s
premises over an extended period of time is beyond comprehension,
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when Hurst was concurrently bribing Heaton to defraud his employer.

Hurst's own admission that, at the time he paid the

kickbacks, he thought it was a "sleazy practice" and that
Heaton1s request for the commission caused his view of Heaton1s
integrity and honesty to drop is of crucial significance.

Hurst

himself testified that he was paying Heaton a kickback to cause
Steelco to purchase "rough material" -- junk.

Nevertheless,

Hurst did not advise Steelco of this fact, Hurst never inquired
about Heaton1s authority to be paid, individually, for huge
amounts of steel removed over an extended period from Steelcofs
premises, and Hurst materially participated in the concealment of
the fraud.
When Steelco first discovered Heatonfs thefts and
approached Hurst for assistance in determining their extent,
Hurst did not react like an honest businessman.

He insisted on

speaking to his attorney first and then, before talking to
Elkington, he and Heaton got their stories straight.

Heaton told

Elkington that he delivered less than $10,000 worth of scrap to
Hurst and Hurst confirmed that phony number.

Hurst withheld

records from Elkington and the only records Elkington saw were
those handpicked by Hurst, which had to be pried out of Hurst
year by year.

Although Hurst knew that Elkington was investigat-

ing the nature and extent of Heatonfs improper activities, and
Hurst admitted that it would have been important for Elkington to
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know about the kickbacks, Hurst never told Elkington about the
kickbacks.

[R454 at 157.]
It is doubtful that many defendants candidly admit

their knowledge and participation in fraudulent activities. All
of the evidence other than Mr. Hurst's version of things, however,
convincingly points to Hurst and Wasatch Steel's knowledge of and
affirmative participation in a scheme to defraud Steelco through
purchasing its stolen steel at bargain prices and inflating the
prices paid by Steelco for materials sold by Wasatch Steel
through the kickback scheme.
2.

There was a Conspiratorial Agreement.

At pages

51-52, defendants, again without marshaling the evidence, argue
that the evidence does not support the existence of a conspiracy
agreement, which the court found in both its Memorandum Decision
and its Findings.

As the Court stated in Israel Pagan Estate v.

Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah App. 1987), "it is not necessary
in a civil conspiracy action to prove that the parties actually
came together and entered into a formal agreement to do the acts
complained of by direct evidence.

Instead, conspiracy may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the nature of
the act done, the relations of the parties, and the interests of
the alleged conspirators.ff

With respect to kickbacks, the

arrangement was clear and express:

Both Volma Heaton and Chris

Williams testified that Hurst would quote a price which
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would then be inflated by agreement depending upon how much of a
kickback was to be paid.

The parties1 agreement that Wasatch

Steel would accept stolen steel and pay a low price for it can be
inferred from their having done so for years, from their obvious
efforts to keep the arrangement secret, from their cooperative
efforts to conceal the thefts and resales from Steelcofs management, from Hurst's knowledge of the fact that the steel was
stolen, from Hurst's lying to Elkington about the unavailability
of part of his records, and from Hurst's and Heaton's agreement
to confirm to Elkington a phony, reduced amount of steel that was
purchased by Wasatch Steel.
3.
Steal.

Heaton had no Actual or Apparent Authority to

At pages 52-56, defendants argue that Heaton was clothed

by Steelco with actual or apparent authority to act as he did.
Both the court's Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact
found that Heaton had no actual or apparent authority to sell
remnant steel to Wasatch Steel.

Since the court found that Hurst

and Wasatch Steel knew that Heaton was stealing from Steelco the
material that he was reselling to Wasatch Steel, it is selfevident that the defendants did not rely upon any "apparent
authority" of Heaton in their dealings with him.

It is mystify-

ing how defendants can ask this Court to believe that they relied
upon the bona fides of a man to whom they were regularly paying
bribes.
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The doctrine of apparent authority is not even applicable here.

If Steelco led Hurst to believe that Heaton was

authorized to sell the steel, then Hurst should have been writing
checks to Steelco and the doctrine of apparent agency might
vaguely apply to this case. Agency is not an issue in this
case -- Hurst does not even claim he was dealing with Steelco.
Even if the doctrine of apparent authority had application here, it requires that the principal lead third parties to
believe that the agent has authority to bind the principal. Bank
of Salt Lake v. The Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).

The

court found that Steelco did nothing to mislead defendants about
Heaton1s authority.

Implied authority, about which defendants

also speak, merely affords an agent implied authority to do the
natural and ordinary incidents of what is expressly authorized.
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah 1978).

Here, it is uncon-

tested that Heaton was not expressly authorized to sell steel to
third parties or, more obviously, to steal steel from his employer.
This section of defendants1 brief is a self-serving,
misleading, and inaccurate recitation of facts and events. Many,
if not most, of defendants1 statements have no record support or
citation.

Defendants, who admit bribing a Steelco employee to

defraud his employer, assert that "Defendants1 dealings with
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Steelco were entirely consistent with normal business practices.
There is nothing unusual or improper in Mr. Hurst's dealing with
plaintiffs1 Superintendent. . . ." Another example is defendants1 statement that others made purchases from Heaton "without
suspecting any lack of authority."

Although others surely

purchased from Heaton, the remainder of the statement is devoid
of record support.
The court's finding that Steelco did nothing to clothe
Heaton with authority to deal as he did with defendants is
supported by the record.

At pages 7-12 of the statement of facts

of this brief are set forth some of the evidence supporting that
finding.
4.
Inaccurate.

Defendants1 Characterization of the Kickbacks is
At pages 56-57, defendants distort and misrepresent

the record on the subject of the kickbacks.

An accurate descrip-

tion of the kickback transactions is found at pages 14-21 of the
statement of facts section of this brief.

The trial court found

that Hurst paid Volma Heaton eight kickbacks totaling in excess
of $4,000 and, in addition, paid Chris Williams multiple kickbacks in an amount aggregating $5,700.

Defendants1 statement

that there were only four kickbacks is inaccurate.

Defendants

state that Elkington did not see records disclosing the kickbacks
when he asked Wasatch Steel for this information because he did
not ask to review the check register.

-63-

That is not true and the

record does not support that statement.

Even though Elkington

asked Hurst about the unlawful activities of Heaton, Hurst did
not disclose that he had been paying bribes to Heaton, one as
recently as two months prior to Elkingtonfs visit.
Defendants argue that the

ff

ballastM steel, upon which

some of the kickbacks were paid, needed no special appearance,
served its intended purpose, was competitively priced, and that
as a result Steelco suffered no loss.

The court's findings, and

the evidence, are that the junk that Hurst peddled using his
bribery scheme did not fulfill the requirements for ballast,
required huge amounts of extra labor to prepare it for its
intended use, and that over 30,000 pounds of the stuff is still
sitting in SteelcoTs yard, unused and unusable.
Wasatch Steel's self-serving recitation in this portion
of its brief leaves the reader with the impression that Mr. Hurst
is on the verge of sainthood.

As has been demonstrated, the

testimony of Mr. Hurst, alone, is sufficient to establish his
commission of the crime of bribery.
5.

Hurst Paid Chris Williams Kickbacks.

In both its

Memorandum Decision and Findings, the court found that Hurst paid
Chris Williams multiple kickbacks. Again, defendants have made
no effort to marshal the evidence, as they must, but instead have
advanced a self-serving, incomplete, and inaccurate recitation of
the evidence.
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As Chris Williams candidly admitted during her testimony, she was a drug user during her employment in Steelco1s
purchasing department and stole money to support her habit.
Steelco fired her in June of 1986 for stealing cash.

In October

of 1987, she checked herself into Highland Ridge Hospital for
five weeks and, except for one use of drugs on November 27, 1988,
Chris has not used alcohol or drugs at any time since.
155-57.]
mous.

[R451 at

She is presently an active member of Alcoholics Anony-

[R451 at 157.]

Two years after she was fired, Chris

voluntarily returned to Steelco and advised Elkington of all of
her unlawful activities, of which Steelco was previously unaware.
Very significantly, at the time she so informed Steelco, Steelco
was ignorant of any kickbacks being paid to anyone.
not informed Steelco of his kickback arrangement.

Heaton had

Williams

advised Elkington that Heaton had told her of his kickback
arrangements with Hurst which in turn prompted Williams to engage
in the same activity.

It is absolutely inconsistent that Williams

would fabricate her receipt of kickbacks when (i) she had no
motive to do so and (ii) she was the first person to advise
Steelco of the kickback arrangements, which have since been fully
corroborated by both Mr. Hurst and Mr. Heaton.
All of Heaton, Williams, and Midgley testified that
Hurst knew and dealt with Chris Williams. Hurst testified that
he had never seen her prior to her deposition in this case.
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Defendants suggest that there is nothing in Wasatch
Steelfs records to show any kickbacks to Chris Williams.
not surprising, for three reasons.

That is

First, Chris Williams tes-

tified that Hurst paid her kickbacks in cash; Heaton's kickbacks
were paid with checks, thereby leaving a record.

Second, Wasatch

Steelfs cash records were first completely stolen and then
selectively reappeared.

Hurst testified in his deposition that

"all11 of his cash records relating to the period during which
Williams received her kickbacks were stolen, although at trial he
conveniently located a few "stolen11 records to serve his own
evidentiary purposes.

The date of the alleged theft was very

shortly after Elkington began his investigation into Wasatch
Steel's activities.

Hurstfs bookkeeper, from whom he testified

the records were stolen, was not called as a witness at trial.
The absence of Wasatch Steel's cash records concerning kickbacks
paid to Williams is not at all surprising.

Third, whereas Heaton

was paid kickbacks by Wasatch Steel checks, in the case of Chris
Williams, the cash kickback amount was split between Williams and
Hurst.

After agreeing with Hurst on an amount by which the usual

price of the goods would be jacked up, Hurst and Williams would
split the difference.

[R451 at 152-53.]

Hurst, himself, re-

ceived approximately 20% of the difference in cash.
187-91.]

[R451 at

Hurst may not have wanted to keep a record of his
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activities since he, himself, may have been defrauding Wasatch
Steel by personally receiving these cash payments.
Defendants correctly indicate that, shortly before
trial, Ms. Williams destroyed her diary, which contained a record
of the kickbacks that were paid to her.

Williams prepared

another document summarizing the inappropriate financial dealings
while at Steelco which were contained in her diary.
146-47.]

[R451 at

Chris Williams testified that she threw away her

personal diary because "that is in my past now.

I didn't want to

bring that up.

I don't need to look at that anymore.

diaries away.11

[R451 at 160-61.]

I threw my

The lost diary is understand-

able and of no significance.
As they did in their statement of facts, defendants at
page 58 of their brief attempt to discredit Chris Williams'
testimony by attempting to show mathematical disparities in the
kickback transactions.

As indicated in the statement of facts

above, however, these disparities exist only if Chris Williams
was paid the exact amounts on the three exact transactions
identified by defendants, and no others.
so testify.

Chris Williams did not

She was sure only of the total amount received in

kickbacks -- she was understandably unsure of the exact transactions on which she was paid, the exact amounts involved in any
transaction, the exact period of time during which the kickbacks
were paid, or the exact number of kickbacks that she was paid.
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Chris Williams1 testimony needs no corroboration, but
even if it did, it is corroborated by Hurst and Heatonfs testimony that Hurst was regularly paying bribes to Steelco's employees, a fact that Chris Williams was the first to disclose to
Steelco.

It is also corroborated by Lynn Hurst's offering false

testimony during his deposition that all of the cash records that
may have evidenced these commissions were stolen.

It is also

corroborated by the fact that although each of Chris Williams,
Heaton, and Patty Midgley testified that Hurst knew and dealt
with Chris Williams, Hurst denied ever having seen her prior to
her deposition.

If Hurst is lying about having never seen Chris

Williams, he is just as surely lying about not having paid bribes
to her, just as he did regularly with Heaton.
6.

The Court's Findings on Conversion are Supported.

At pages 60-61 of their brief, defendants suggest that (i) Heaton
was entitled to receive some of the steel that he sold and (ii)
Heaton!s apparent authority precludes conversion.

With respect

to the first point, the trial court clearly delineated the
materials that were given to Heaton from those that Heaton stole,
and plaintiffs were not awarded damages with respect to the
materials that were Heaton?s to sell.

The court's findings and

the evidence supporting those findings is set forth at pages
12-1U of the statement of facts above.

On the authority issue,

it has already been demonstrated that Heaton had no such author-
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ity, and, in any event, defendants knew that the steel was
stolen.

Even if they did not, however, under established Utah

law, even a party innocently purchasing from a thief is liable in
conversion.
The intent required for conversion is not any wrongful
intent; rather, the defendant need only intend to exercise a
dominion or control over the goods -- that is, if Wasatch Steel
intended to take possession of and resell the goods, the intent
element is fulfilled.

That fact is uncontested.

A purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer
who sells them in the utmost good faith
becomes a converter, since his acts are an
interference with the control of the property. W. Prosser, Law of Torts at 83 (4th
Ed. 1971).
In Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726 (Utah 1958), the Supreme Court
addressed conversion in the context of a party's receipt of
stolen property.

There, seed growers delivered seed to one

Malin, who without their authority sold the seed to Union Seed
Company.

The growers sued the seed company for conversion.

Supreme Court stated as follows:
Although conversion results only from intentional conduct it does not require a conscious wrongdoing, but only an intent to
exercise dominion or control over the goods
inconsistent with the owner's right., A
purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer
who sells them in good faith becomes a
converter since his acts are an interference
with the control of the property or in other
words, a claiming of the ownership in such
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The

property and taking it out of the possession
of someone else with intentions of exercising
dominion over it is a conversion. Thus, a
bona fide purchaser of goods for value from
one who has no right to sell them becomes a
converter when he takes possession of such
goods. Ld. at 728.
The Allred case is indistinguishable from this case -- even
assuming that Steelco entrusted portions of the steel to Heaton's
care and that by virtue of his position at Steelco Heaton had
apparent authority to sell the steel, he nonetheless lacked
actual authority and, accordingly, Wasatch Steel's purchases
amounted to a conversion, regardless of defendants1 good faith.
Just this year, the Supreme Court affirmed its Allred holding in
Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah
1991).
Defendants1 argument necessarily rests upon the proposition that a good faith purchaser should not be liable for
conversion.

The courts have unanimously held that a purchaser's

good faith or knowledge is irrelevant to a cause of action for
conversion.

Matter of 1969 Chevrolet, 656 P.2d 646 (Ariz. App.

1982); Moore v. Regents of University of California, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (Cal. App. 1988); Klam v. Koppel, 118 P.2d 729 (Idaho
1941); Nelson v. Hy-Grade Constr. & Materials, Inc., 527 P.2d
1059 (Kan. 1974); Bader v. Cerri, 609 P.2d 314 (Nev. 1980);
Jeddkins v. Sadler-MacNeil, 376 P.2d 837 (Wash. 1962); Seay v.
Vialpando, 567 P.2d 285 (Wyo. 1977).

-70-

The two cases cited by

defendants are inapposite.

They concern a partner's authority to

bind a partnership and whether a corporation's general manager
had authority to bind the corporation.

Here, it is undisputed

that Volma Heaton did not have authority to steal and resell his
employerf s products.
IV.

THE MEASURE AND CALCULATION OF

DAMAGES WAS APPROPRIATE
A.

The Amount of Damages Awarded was Correct.

At pages

61-63, defendants argue that the court applied a retail value
measure of damages for the conversion claim, which was inappropriate.

As defendants concede, the court awarded to Steelco the

amount that Wasatch Steel received on resale for the goods that
were stolen from Steelco.

The Utah Supreme Court has on multiple

occasions indicated that the measure of damages for a conversion
is the "value" of the property at or near the time of conversion.
Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364
P.2d 418 (Utah 1961).

"Value" or "market value" is the retail,

not the wholesale value of the goods.

In Henderson v. For-Shor

Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988), the Court stated as follows:
The measure of damages for conversion when
property is not returned is the value of the
property at the time of the conversion, plus
interest. * * * Market value is defined as
the price for which the property is bought
and sold at retail in the marketplace or, in
the case of unique property, the value to the
owner. Id. at 468.
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The Henderson Court relied in part upon the case of Winters v.
Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978), in which the
Supreme Court stated that the measure of value for the loss of
personal property is the price for which the article is bought
and sold in the marketplace, "and the legal definition of that
price is retail, not wholesale."

Id. at 454. Defendants argue

that, although retail is the proper measure in a consumer
context, wholesale is the proper measure when the plaintiff is a
dealer in the goods converted.

In Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d

726 (Utah 1958), the farmers were allowed to recover the difference between the price paid by the purchaser, Union Seed Company,
and the price they actually received from Malin -- thus, the
damage award was based on sales price, not the cost of replacement.

Similarly, in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418 (Utah 1961),

the Court held that the appropriate measure of damages is the
"market value" of the forms converted, not the replacement cost.
Id. at 421-22.
Here, the "market value" adopted by the court was, as
defendants admit, based upon Hurst's own testimony as to that
"value" -- the amount that he could resell the goods for.
Whether that measure is "market value," for which Hurst sold the
goods, or "retail value" is irrelevant.
of Torts §927 comment i (1977) provides:
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The Restatement (Second)

If the converter has disposed of the chattel,
the owner, in addition to his other rights,
can elect to recover the value of the chattel
at the time of the disposition, from the
seller. . . .
Illustration 11 of this section is as follows:
A, bailee at will for B, wrongfully sells to
C for $1,000 bailed commodities then worth
$1,200. Knowing the facts, C sells them for
$1,300 to D. . . . When B discovers the
facts, the commodities have a value of $800.
B is entitled to recover $1,200 from A, or
$1,300 from C. . . . Restatement (Second) of
Torts §927 illustration 11 (1977) .
This illustration is directly on point.

A would be Heaton, B

would be Steelco, and C would be Wasatch Steel. Applying that
illustration, Wasatch Steel should be required to disgorge the
amount it received from the sale of the converted property.

In

Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985),
the defendant, like appellants here, relied upon Section 911 of
the Restatement as authorit3/ that the wholesale price, not the
sale price, is the proper measure of damages.
this argument, reasoning that

The Court rejected

ff

[t]he profit margin is part of the

value as inventory, even though, like the rest of the price, it
is not realized until sale."

Id. at 606-07.

Wasatch Steel by

resale established market value, and under all authorities,
Steelco is entitled to recover that market value.
Even if this Court were to reject the measure of damages
applied by the trial court for conversion, the lower court, with
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respect to fraud and conspiracy, found the value of the very same
materials based upon the amount that Steelco was required to pay
to replace the material.
168-71.]

[Finding of Fact t60; R358; R452 at

Thus, even if the Court adopts defendantsf view of the

measure of damages, the trial court has already found the amount
of Steelcofs damages based upon the measure of damages advocated
by defendants, and no retrial is necessary.
B.

The Court's Damage Findings Were Correct. At pages

63-66 of their brief, defendants pursue their standard practice
of ignoring all of the evidence supporting the court's findings,
inaccurately stating the evidence favorable to themselves, and
failing to advance record support for the statements lacking such
support.

As the statement of facts above reveals, Wasatch Steel

purchased only remnant, not scrap, from Heaton. As Hurst,
himself, testified, Wasatch Steel resold what it purchased from
Heaton for double what was paid to Heaton.

The remnant steel

that was stolen was in the main taken from remnant racks, where
it was placed to be reused, as new steel, in Steelcofs fabrication operation.

The remnant material was worth as much to

Steelco as new steel -- the pieces were just smaller. The
uncontested facts are that Heaton stole remnant material from
Steelco and that the remnant material had the same value to
Steelco as new steel. The court so found, and the record supports that finding.

The court awarded to plaintiffs under their
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conversion theory the amount that, according to Hurst, Wasatch
Steel sold the material for.

Under Steelco's fraud and conspir-

acy theories, the court awarded to Steelco the value of the goods
stolen to Steelco -- based upon the amount that Steelco would be
required to pay to purchase the very same goods.

There is

neither mystery nor distortion in the trial court's finding as
suggested by defendants.
C.

The Court's Award of Attorney's Fees was Appropriate.

At pages 66-67 of their brief, defendants argue that there was no
legal basis for the award of attorney's fees here.

Whenever

exemplary damages are awardable, attorney's fees are properly
awardable.

DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capitol Int'1 Airways, 583

P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1978).

As will be demonstrated in the

section that follows, exemplary damages are appropriate, and so
also is an award of attorney's fees.
D.

Punitive Damages are Appropriate Here.

In Atkin Wright

& Miles v. The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 709
P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court stated the standard for
recovery of punitive damages:

"[P]laintiff must prove conduct

that is willful and malicious . . . or that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights of
others."

Id. at 337; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 164 Utah

Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991).

In two Utah cases, the Court in a

conversion context has sustained punitive damage awards when the
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defendant's conduct was knowing.

Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354

(Utah 1975); First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
We are not here dealing with a jury gone wild.

Judge

Russon, a respected judge, heard all of the evidence and himself
made detailed findings in his Memorandum Decision which included
findings that defendants' actions "were willful and made with
reckless disregard to the rights of others, and punitive damages
are, therefore, appropriate.

Punitive damages are for the

purpose of punishment, and a deterrent and warning to defendant
and others that such behavior will not be tolerated by society.tf
[R278.]

As has been amply demonstrated above, defendants1

conduct, including conspiring to defraud Steelco of vast quantities of stolen steel and payment of multiple bribes to multiple
employees of Steelco, amply support an award of punitive damages
in this case.

By Hurst's own testimony, he knew what he was

doing was wrong and a sleazy, dishonest practice. Hurst continued to pay kickbacks and receive stolen steel at bargain
prices, however, because he could not have cared less about
Steelcofs legitimate rights -- he was too busy making money from
his sleazy dealings with Steelcofs dishonest employees. What we
have here is a company which obviously did not care about what
was right of wrong -- Wasatch Steel and Hurst cared only about
what they could get away with.

But for the existence of the
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Wasatch Steels and Lynn Hursts of the world, people with drug
problems would have difficulty selling their stolen goods, and
dishonest employees would have difficulty defrauding and stealing
from their employers.

Hurst and Wasatch Steel, through their

indifference towards the law and the rights of Steelco, allowed
this pervasive fraud to go on for in excess of four years -until a recovering drug abuser who decided to make a clean break
of it told the truth.

But for Steelco's independent discovery of

Heaton's thefts and Chris Williams' commendable conduct of coming
forward with the truth, Hurst and Wasatch Steel would undoubtedly
still be paying kickbacks to Steelco's employees and purchasing
steel stolen from Steelco's premises.

Exemplary damages are

required here.
In fixing the amount of punitive damages, the finder of fact
must consider (i) the nature of defendant's acts, (ii) the
probability of those facts being repeated in the future, and
(iii) the relative wealth of defendant.

Terry v. Zions Coopera-

tive Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

The trial court

considered each of those factors in arriving at its exemplary
damage award of $100,000.

[R353 152.]

A punitive damage award will be affirmed unless it appears
that the award "has resulted from passion or prejudice rather
than reason and justice."

First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feed-

yards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1982).
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Here, the nature of

defendants' acts is reprehensible.

The probability of those acts

being repeated in the future is unquestionably good, since
Wasatch Steel's business is conducive of receiving stolen property and Lynn Hurst has told the court that he sees nothing wrong
with kickbacks.

The relative wealth of defendants is the remain-

ing consideration.
Wasatch Steel's relative wealth is demonstrated through
Exhibits 49-P and 50-P.

Those financial records, which were

prepared by Wasatch Steel specifically for trial, no doubt
understate or at least conservatively state the wealth of Wasatch
Steel.

Even so, Exhibit 49-P reflects a net worth of Wasatch

Steel in the amount of $461,087.07. That substantial figure
would, according to Hurst's own testimony, be increased by at
least a good part of the accumulated depreciation amount of
$145,331.55 shown on page 1 since he testified that the value of
the company's assets was as shown on the balance sheet without
regard to depreciation.

[R454 at 24-26.]

In addition, that net

worth figure includes a downward adjustment of an unexplained
"prior period adjustment" in the amount of $63,281.98 shown on
the second page. With respect to Exhibit 50-P, Hurst admitted
that Wasatch Steel makes about $9,000 per month in clear profit,
and that is even after the owners are furnished with their
multiple fringe benefits.

Even at a conservative $9,000 per

month profit figure, Hurst testified that the business might be
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worth a million dollars.

[R454 at 32-33.]

Hurst owned 15Z of

Wasatch Steel.
Thus, the hundred thousand dollar punitive damage award can
be viewed as eleventh months of Wasatch Steel's profits or
one-tenth of Wasatch Steelfs net worth.

Steelco's actual damages,

exclusive of interest, are more than three-quarters of the
punitive damage award amount.

If interest is considered, actual

damages exceed the punitive damage award.
The court has recently sustained multiple punitive damage
awards in the range of this one, where punitive damages range
from one-half to twice the amount of actual damages.

Synergetics

v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Von
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); First Security Bank v.
J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 592 (Utah 1982).

The exemplary

damage award by the court in this case is well within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1991).

There, the Court held that where the punitive damage

award is less than $100,000, an award is not excessive Mwhen
punitives do not exceed actual damages by more than a ratio of
approximately three to one."

Id. at 13.

In this case, multiple factors justify the exemplary damage
award and its amount.

First, the award was created by a thought-

ful judge, not an impassioned jury.
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Second, defendants1 conduct

was particularly reprehensible.

Defendants' knowing, intentional,

fraudulent behavior systematically occurred over an extended
period of time and involved conduct rising to the level of
criminal activity -- knowing receipt of stolen property and
bribery.

Third, as the record in this case amply demonstrates,

Wasatch Steel's controlling personality, Lynn Hurst, is a
palpable liar who testified at trial that he had no problem with
kickbacks.

Fourth, the amount of the punitive damage award is

reasonable in relation both to the actual damages sustained by
Steelco and the wealth of defendants.

The award is appropriate

and should be sustained.

CROSS APPEAL
V.

STEELCO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER
THE RACKETEERING ACT

The trial court found that Steelco did not prove its claims
under the Racketeering Enterprises Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§76-10-1601, elt seq. (the "Act") because Wasatch Steel and Hurst
engaged only in three or more episodes of unlawful activity
involving only one victim, Steelco -- the trial court held that
the Act requires proof of episodes of unlawful activity involving
three separate victims.

[R279 at 25; R359 at 62.]

The trial

court found all other elements of defendants1 liability under the
Act.
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Section 76-10-1605 of the Act provides for a private remedy
as follows:
(1) A person injured in his person,
business, or property by a person engaged in
conduct forbidden by any provision of Section
76-10-1603 may sue in appropriate district
court and recover twice the damages he
sustains, regardless of whether:
a) the
injury is separate or distinct frc the
injury suffered as a result of the acts or
conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful
conduct alleged as part of the cause of
action; or (b) the conduct has been adjudged
criminal by any court of the state or of the
United States.
(2) A party who prevails on a cause of
action brought under this section recovers
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorneyfs fee.
* * *

(4) In all actions under this section,
a principal is liable for actual damages for
harm caused by an agent acting within the
scope of either his employment or apparent
authority, A principal is liable for double
damages only if the pattern of unlawful
activity alleged and proven as part of the
cause of action was authorized, solicited,
requested, commanded, undertaken, performed,
or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or a high managerial agent acting
within the scope of his employment.
Thus, the predicate for liability under the Act is a violation of
Section 76-10-1603, which in turn provides as follows:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who
has received any proceeds derived, whether
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
unlawful activity in which the person has
participated as a principal, to use or
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invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
that income, or the proceeds of the income,
or the proceeds derived from the investment
or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person
through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise
to conduct or participate, whether directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to
conspire to violate a provision of Subsections (1), (2) or (3).
Section 1603, then, requires that the defendant engage in a
"pattern of unlawful activity."

That phrase is defined in

Section 76-10-1602(2) as follows:
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity"
means engaging in conduct which constitutes
the commission of at least three episodes of
unlawful activity, which episodes are not
isolated, but have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and
be related either to each other or to the
enterprise. At least one of the episodes
comprising a pattern of unlawful activity
shall have occurred after July 31, 1981. The
most recent act constituting part of a
pattern of unlawful activity as defined by
this part shall have occurred within five
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years of the commission of the next preceding
act alleged as part of the pattern.
That section, in turn, is predicated upon the commission of
episodes of "unlawful activity,11 which is defined in turn in
Section 76-10-1602(4) :
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to
directly engage in conduct or to solicit,
request, command, encourage, or intentionally
aid another person to engage in conduct which
would constitute any offense described by the
following crimes or categories of crimes, or
to attempt or conspire to engage in an act
which would constitute any of those offenses,
regardless of whether the act is in fact
charged or indicted by any authority or is
classified as a misdemeanor or felony: * * *
(k) theft, Section 76-6-404; * * * (n)
receiving stolen property, Section 76-6-408;
* * * (s) bribery or receiving bribe by
person in the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods, Section
76-6-508.
The trial court found each required element to defendants1
liability under the Act:
1.

Injury to plaintiff's business or property

[Section 76-10-1605].

See Findings of Fact 1116, 17,

30, 41, 45 [R335, et seq.1.
2.

Use of proceeds of unlawful activity in the

establishment or operation of a business or participate
in a business!s affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity (pattern of unlawful activity being described
below under paragraph 3) [Section 76-10-1603].
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See

Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 32, 33, 34, 35 [R335, et
seq.].
3.

Participation in at least three episodes of

similar or related conduct for financial gain involving
a.

Theft [Section 76-6-404].

See Findings

of Fact 1114, 15, 20, 26 [R335, et seq.].
or

b.

Receiving stolen property [Section

76-6-408].

See Findings of Fact 1114, 15, 26

[R335, e_t seq. ] .
or

c.

Bribery [Section 76-6-508].

See Find-

ings of Fact 1131, 32, 33, 34 [R335, et seq.].
or

d.

going.

Aiding or soliciting any of the fore[Section 76-10-1602(4)].

See Findings of

Fact 1114, 42 [R335, et seq.].
or

e.

Conspiring to commit any of the fore-

going [Section 76-10-1602(4)].

See Findings of

Fact 1114, 42 [R335, et seq.].
4.

One episode must occur after July 31, 1981

and another within five years of the next preceding
episode [Section 76-10-1602(2)].

See Finding of Fact

110, Exhibit 27-P, Finding of Fact 132 [R335, et seq.].
Thus, the trial court found each and every element required
to subject defendants to liability under the Act. The trial
court erred in construing Section 76-10-1602(2) to require three
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separate episodes of unlawful activity involving separate victims . There is no basis in the language of that section to infer
such a requirement; indeed, the section suggests the opposite
interpretation.

Section 76-10-1602(2) requires that the episodes

"have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission. . . . Taken together, the
episodes shall . . . be related either to each other or to the
enterprise."

In this case, as the court found, Hurst, Williams,

and Heaton ("similar participants") systematically engaged in
multiple briberies and thefts ("similar methods of commission and
results") involving Steelco (the "same victim") -- a classic
racketeering offense.
Since the trial court found each element to defendants1
liability under the Act, Steelco is entitled to judgment against
defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $211,480.66
as shown on Exhibit 32-P, interest on the doubled principal
amount thereof, and Steelco1s attorney's fees, which the court
found to be $35,850. Exhibit 32-P is merely a summary of the
losses suffered by Steelco as a result of the thefts of its steel
and kickbacks (the dollar amounts of which were specifically
found by the trial court as paragraphs 17, 30, and 41 of its
Findings of Fact), which doubles the damage amounts as prescribed
by the Act. Steelco is entitled to the substitution of its
greater recoverable damages under the Act for the damage amounts
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awarded in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Judgment relating to the
stolen steel and kickbacks.

Under the Act, Steelco is plainly

entitled to recover its attorney's fees [Section 76-10-1605(2)],
and the limitations period under the Act unquestionably has not
run [Section 76-10-1605(9)].
VI. STEELCO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
UNDER THE RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY"STATUTE
The trial court found that Steelco did not prove its claims
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(2) (the "Statute") because Wasatch
Steel was not in a business of the sort contemplated by Section
76-6-408(2)(d), which is incorporated in the Statute.
of Fact 1(63; R359.]

[Finding

The trial court found all elements to

defendants' liability under the Statute, but erred in its legal
interpretation of Section 76-6-408(2)(d).
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(2) provides:
(2) Any person who has been injured by
a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) may
bring an action against any person mentioned
in Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d) for three times
the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit and
reasonable attorney's fees.
Section 76-6-408(1) generally provides that a person commits
theft if he receives or disposes of property knowing that it is
stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen.

The trial

court found that Hurst and Wasatch Steel received multiple loads
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of steel from Heaton knowing that it had been stolen and that
Steelco was injured as a result.
R338.]

[Findings of Fact K U 3 , 41;

This element is satisfied.

The Statute only renders liable a "person mentioned in
Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d)."

The entirety of Section 76-6-408 is

quoted below:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing
that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably
has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or
aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such
property from the owner, knowing the property to be
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) Is found in possession or control of
other property stolen on a separate occasion; or
(b) Has received other stolen property
within the year preceding the receiving offense
charged; or
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort
received, retained, or disposed, acquires it for a
consideration which he knows is far below its
reasonable value.
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or
operates a business dealing in or collecting used
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or
an agent, employee or representative of the
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person
delivering the property to certify, in writing,
that he has the legal rights to sell the property.
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If the value given for the property, exceeds $20
the pawnbroker or person shall also require the
seller or person delivering the property to obtain
a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at
the bottom of the certificate next to his signature and at least one other positive form of
identification.
(i) Every pawnbroker or person who has
or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, and every agent, employee or
representative of the pawnbroker or person
who fails to comply with the requirements of
(d) shall be presumed to have bought, received or obtained the property knowing it to
have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.
This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(ii) When in a prosecution under this
section it appears from the evidence that the
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who
has or operates a business dealing in or
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or
personal property, or was an agent, employee,
or representative of a pawnbroker or person,
that the defendant bought, received, concealed or withheld the property without
requiring the person from whom he bought,
received, or obtained the property to sign
the certificate required in paragraph (d) and
in the event the transaction involves an
amount exceeding $20 also place his legible
print, preferably the right thumb, on the
certificate, then the burden shall be upon
the defendant to show that the property
bought, received or obtained was not stolen.
Thus, apart from the trial court's finding that defendants knew
the steel was stolen, the Statute provides that Wasatch Steel is
presumed to have known or believed that the property was stolen
or probably stolen if (a) it was in possession of property stolen
on a separate occasion, as the court found in Finding No. 10
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[76-6-408(2)(a)] or (b) it received stolen property within the
year preceding the transaction in question, as the court found in
Finding No. 10 [76-6-408(2)(b)] or (c) it acquired the material
for consideration known to be far below its value, as the court
found in Finding No. 14 [76-6-408(2)(c)] or (d), being in the
used steel business, it received property from Volma Heaton and
failed to require that he in writing certify as to his ownership
of the property, as Mr. Hurst himself testified was the case
[R450 at 68] [76-6-408(2)(d)].
The trial court, although finding each element to defendants1 liability under the Statute, dismissed this claim on the
ground that M[n]either Wasatch Steel Inc. nor Hurst is fa pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in used
or collecting used or second-hand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee or representative of the pawnbroker
or person who buys, receives or obtains property1 within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408(2)(d)."
R359].

[Finding No. 63;

The quoted language expressly includes pawnbrokers OR a

person who deals in used or second-hand property.

The trial

court found, and the evidence was undisputed on this point, that
n

Wasatch Steel Inc. is in the business of purchasing and selling

both new and used steel.11

[Finding No. 3; R335] . In this case

itself, Wasatch Steel received on the order of 100 loads of used
steel from Heaton.

Wasatch Steel and Hurst are, according to the
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court's findings, parties within the statutory definition of
persons liable under the Statute.
Steelco is therefore entitled to judgment under the Statute
against Hurst and Wasatch Steel, jointly and severally, in the
amount of $271,051.93 shown on Exhibit 33-P, interest on the
trebled principal amount thereof, and Steelcofs attorney's fees,
which the court found to be $35,850.

Exhibit 33-P is merely a

summary of the losses suffered by Steelco as a result of the
thefts of its steel (the dollar amounts of which were specifically found by the trial court at paragraphs 17 and 30 of its
Findings of Fact) which triples the damage amounts as prescribed
by the Statute.

These amounts should be substituted for the

amount awarded under paragraph 1 of the Judgment relating to
stolen steel.

The Statute clearly allows Steelco to recover its

attorney's fees [§76-6-412(2)], and there has been no limitations
defense pleaded or argued with respect to Steelco's claims under
the Statute.
CONCLUSION
Steelco seeks the following relief in this appeal and cross
appeal:
First, Steelco requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's Judgment in all respects other than its dismissal of
Steelco's claims under the Racketeering Enterprises Act and
receiving stolen property statute.
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Second, Steelco requests that this Court award it judgment
under the receiving stolen property statute in the trebled amount
of $271,051.93, and interest, which amount should be substituted
for the corresponding amount awarded by the trial court for the
stolen steel loss in paragraph 1 of the Judgment.
Third, Steelco requests that this Court award it judgment
under the Racketeering Enterprises Act in the doubled amount of
$211,480.66, which amount should be substituted for the corresponding amounts awarded by the trial court for both stolen steel
and kickback transactions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Judgment.
If this Court grants relief under the receiving stolen property
statute, the larger trebled amount thereof noted under the
preceding paragraph ($271,051.93) should be added to double the
amount of Steelco1s kickback damages ($31,958.30 -- see Finding
No. 61 for undoubled amount) to arrive at the amount of
$303,010.23, which should be substituted for paragraphs 1 and 2
of the court's Judgment.
Fourth, Steelco requests that this case be remanded to the
district court for a determination of the attorney's fees incurred on appeal by Steelco, the amount of which should be added
to the attorney's fees awarded through trial by the trial court.
Fifth, Steelco requests an award of its costs on appeal.
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